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 ARTICLES 
PROVIDING LIQUIDITY IN A HIGH-
FREQUENCY WORLD: TRADING 
OBLIGATIONS AND PRIVILEGES OF MARKET 
MAKERS AND A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 
Stanislav Dolgopolov* 
This Article analyzes the reach of a private right of action under federal 
securities law for violations of trading obligations and abuses of trading 
privileges by market makers in today’s rapidly evolving securities markets. 
The development of the applicable case law is traced, and potential 
approaches to a coherent theory of a private right of action are considered. 
The Article also discusses the significance of the changing economics and 
institutional framework of providing liquidity in securities markets and 
related regulatory debates. 
*  *  * 
INTRODUCTION 
Market makers, entities that provide liquidity under different names and 
in various forms, continue to play a key role in today’s rapidly evolving 
securities markets characterized by their automation and decentralization, 
the pivotal role played by high-frequency traders, and the complexity of 
trading strategies, execution algorithms, and order types.1 The balance of 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Assistant Adjunct Professor and Lowell Milken Institute Law Teaching Fellow, UCLA 
School of Law. The author thanks Henry G. Manne for his guidance in life and Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Shawn J. Bayern, Haim Bodek, Ross E. Davies, Vladislav Dolgopolov, Haider Ala 
Hamoudi, Philipp Jokisch, Bruce Kobayashi, Andy Nybo, Jamie Oschefski, Rachelle Holmes 
Perkins, Thomas Ross, Elina Treyger, and Jerry Ware for their help, comments, and expertise. The 
support of the Lowell Milken Institute for Business Law and Policy at UCLA School of Law is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
 1. For a selective mix of sources discussing the recent developments in securities markets, 
with some of them concentrating on high-frequency trading, see Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High-
Frequency Trading, and Other Market Structure Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., 
Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter 
Senate Hearing on Market Structure Issues]; Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 
Exchange Act Release No. 61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594 (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter SEC’s Equity 
Market Structure Release]; TECHNICAL COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FR09/11, FINAL 
REPORT, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON 
MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.iosco.org/library 
/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO’S REPORT ON TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES]; 
MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING (2010); James J. Angel et al., Equity 
Trading in the 21st Century, 1 Q.J. FIN. 1 (2011); Bruno Biais & Paul Woolley, High Frequency 
Trading (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://idei.fr/doc/conf/pwri/biais_pwri_0311.pdf. For a discussion of the boundaries and overlaps 
between “high-frequency trading,” “electronic trading,” “algorithmic trading,” and “low-latency 
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trading obligations and privileges of market makers, an important part of 
the regulatory framework for securities markets, is established by 
governmental regulation, such as rules of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) adopted primarily under the mandate of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and private regulation by trading 
venues in their role as self-regulatory organizations (SROs). This balance, 
the importance of which has been recognized by the federal courts,2 is a 
tradeoff between time, information, fee, order flow allocation, and other 
advantages, on one hand, and compliance with various trading rules, 
including commitments to enter—or not to enter—into transactions under 
specific parameters, such as an “affirmative” obligation to maintain a 
proper market or a “negative” obligation to refrain from certain types of 
proprietary trading, on the other.3 
The nature of this balance at least partly lies in the underlying 
externality: “In general, liquidity provision represents a positive externality 
in that traders who commit capital to make markets are not fully 
compensated for their liquidity services. While the usual solution to this 
inefficiency is a Pigovian subsidy, the form that this payment should take is 
less clear.”4 In fact, several empirical studies suggest that the imposition of 
                                                                                                                 
trading,” see IRENE ALDRIDGE, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
ALGORITHMIC STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS 23–24 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980) (“[The U.S.] Congress[] 
recogni[zed] that specialists contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time they 
exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of buy and sell orders.”); 
Clement v. SEC, 674 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 1983) (“In return for undertaking . . . special 
obligations to the market, market makers enjoy advantages not available to others.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Dissemination of Quotations in NMS Securities, 17 C.F.R. § 240.602 (2012) 
(imposing certain trading obligations on market makers with respect to quoting); Order Approving 
Proposed Rule Changes by Several Self-Regulatory Organizations To Enhance the Quotation 
Standards for Market Makers, Exchange Act Release No. 63,255, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,484 (Nov. 5, 
2010) [hereinafter SEC’s Release on the Quotation Standards for Market Makers] (approving 
proposed rules by various trading venues on trading obligations of market makers in order to 
eliminate the practice of “stub” quotes); Market Maker Categories, in MARKETSMEDIA OPTIONS 
NETWORK 22, 22 (Natasha Gural ed., 2009) (describing different types of options market makers 
on various trading venues and their trading obligations); Andreas Charitou & Marios Panayides, 
Market Making in International Capital Markets: Challenges and Benefits of Its Implementation 
in Emerging Markets, 5 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 50, 62–63 tbl.IV (2009) (describing trading 
obligations and privileges of market makers on several major trading venues); George T. Simon & 
Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and Implications for the Future, 61 BUS. LAW. 
217, 224–25 (2005) (describing the origins of affirmative and negative obligations of market 
makers in the context of the specialist system). 
 4. Kumar Venkataraman & Andrew C. Waisburd, The Value of the Designated Market 
Maker, 42 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 735, 755 (2007). There are different theoretical 
approaches to the nature of the externality in the process of providing liquidity. For instance, it 
may emerge because of the impact of liquidity on issuers that do not necessarily participate in 
secondary trading but cannot be excluded from potential benefits conferred by such liquidity or 
because the nature of the trading process itself with respect to different types of actual or potential 
participants in this process. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market Structure 
and Capital Formation: Incentives for Market Makers?, U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 4–5 & n.8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2169601 . 
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trading obligations on market makers—coupled with privileges—improves 
market quality,5 although there is some skepticism that formal market 
makers are desirable for very liquid securities.6 In order to capture certain 
liquidity-related benefits, issuers themselves sometimes compensate market 
makers for undertaking trading obligations,7 and several empirical studies 
indicate that this mechanism is particularly valuable around such key events 
as secondary offerings, stock splits, and repurchases.8 While issuer-to-
market maker compensation arrangements are effectively prohibited in the 
United States, they have been lobbied for by several trading venues for 
certain types of securities, such as exchange-traded products and smaller-
cap stocks, culminating in specific proposals under which trading venues 
themselves would serve as intermediaries.9 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Amber Anand et al., Paying for Market Quality, 44 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 1427, 
1427 (2009) (analyzing transactions in stocks on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and arguing that 
the existence of designated liquidity providers, entities with affirmative obligations that are 
compensated by issuers, improves market quality and price discovery); M. Nimalendran & 
Giovanni Petrella, Do Thinly-Traded Stocks Benefit from Specialist Intervention?, 27 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 1823, 1829–30, 1851–52 (2003) (analyzing transactions in stocks on the Italian Stock 
Exchange and finding that the existence of specialists, entities with affirmative obligations that 
pay lower trading fees and may be compensated by issuers, is associated with improved market 
quality); Marios A. Panayides, Affirmative Obligations and Market Making with Inventory, 86 J. 
FIN. ECON. 513, 513 (2007) (analyzing transactions in stocks on the New York Stock Exchange, 
finding that affirmative obligations of specialists, entities that enjoyed several important 
privileges, are associated with better market quality, and arguing that their affiliated costs are 
covered by profits from discretionary trading); Narayan Y. Naik & Pradeep K. Yadav, Trading 
Costs of Public Investors with Obligatory and Voluntary Market-Making: Evidence from Market 
Reforms 1, 17, 35 (Eur. Fin. Ass’n, Annual Conference Paper No. 408, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=424982 (analyzing transactions in stocks on the London Stock Exchange 
and arguing that the switch from obligatory to voluntary market making together with the 
abolition of certain informational privileges had an adverse effect on the price stabilization 
function played by dealers); Albert J. Menkveld & Ting Wang, How Do Designated Market 
Makers Create Value for Small-Caps?, J. FIN. MKTS. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 37), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=890526 (analyzing transactions in stocks on Euronext Amsterdam and 
arguing that the existence of designated liquidity providers, entities with affirmative obligations 
that are compensated by issuers, improves market quality). 
 6. See Michael J. Aitken et al., The Role of Market Makers in Electronic Markets: Liquidity 
Providers on Euronext Paris 1 (Apr. 18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
available at http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Barcelona/Papers/EuronExCost.pdf (analyzing 
transactions in stocks on Euronext Paris and finding evidence to “suggest that the prohibition of 
market makers in the most liquid stocks is sound public policy”); see also Senate Hearing on 
Market Structure Issues, supra note 1, at 87 (prepared statement of Peter Driscoll, Chairman, 
Securities Traders Association) (“We believe that there is a need for market making in secondary 
and tertiary issues, but not necessarily the primary tier stocks where data suggests most high 
frequency traders concentrate their activity.”). 
 7. See Anand et al., supra note 5 (evidence from the Stockholm Stock Exchange); 
Nimalendran & Petrella, supra note 5 (evidence from the Italian Stock Exchange); Menkveld & 
Wang, supra note 5 (evidence from Euronext Amsterdam); Johannes A. Skjeltorp & Bernt Arne 
Ødegaard, Why Do Listed Firms Pay for Market Making in Their Own Stock? (May 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1944057 
(evidence from the Oslo Stock Exchange). 
 8. Anand et al., supra note 5, at 1429; Skjeltorp & Ødegaard, supra note 7, at 3. 
 9. See Dolgopolov, supra note 4 (manuscript at 44–46 & nn.129–38). 
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One key question addresses the reach of a private right of action under 
federal securities law for violations of trading obligations and abuses of 
trading privileges by market makers.10 This issue is a challenge to market 
makers and an opportunity for private plaintiffs, notably institutional 
investors and high-frequency traders. The availability of a private right of 
action may be a powerful enforcement mechanism in addition to SEC and 
SRO sanctions, but it may also lead to adverse consequences for the market 
for liquidity. The existing case law on this issue is a thicket of decisions 
from different contexts, which is complicated by the SEC-SRO regulatory 
dichotomy. The rapid evolution of securities markets and accompanying 
regulatory debates also present a number of challenges and concerns. 
This Article analyzes the reach of a private right of action under federal 
securities law for violations of trading obligations and abuses of trading 
privileges by market makers in today’s rapidly evolving securities markets. 
Part I traces the development of the applicable case law. Part II considers 
potential approaches to a coherent theory of a private right of action. Part III 
discusses the significance of the changing economics and institutional 
framework of providing liquidity in securities markets and related 
regulatory debates. The Article concludes by evaluating the legal viability 
of a private right of action for violations of trading obligations and abuses 
of trading privileges by market makers and its desirability from the 
standpoint of public policy. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE LAW ON A PRIVATE 
RIGHT OF ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH TRADING 
OBLIGATIONS AND PRIVILEGES OF MARKET MAKERS 
Several cases have examined different aspects of liability of market 
makers in connection with their trading obligations and privileges. While 
some of them specifically focused on the availability of a private right of 
action, several others addressed the interrelated issue of securities fraud in 
the criminal context. 
                                                                                                                 
 10. The relevant inquiry primarily pertains to the limits of the antifraud prohibition under 
federal securities law embodied by section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 
for the purposes of this Article, for which the existence of an implied private right of action has 
been universally recognized. See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 
U.S. 2296, 2301–02 (2011) (“Although neither Rule 10b-5 nor § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] 
expressly creates a private right of action, this Court has held that ‘a private right of action is 
implied under § 10(b).’ That holding ‘remains the law,’ but ‘[c]oncerns with the judicial creation 
of a private cause of action caution against its expansion.’”) (internal citations omitted). However, 
another aspect is whether an implied private right of action exists under other provisions of the 
federal securities statutes, such as sections 6, 15, 15A, and 19 of the Exchange Act that govern the 
process of SROs’ registration, require them to adopt—under the SEC’s supervision—certain rules 
for their respective members, and impose mandatory membership in such SROs on broker-dealers, 
or even the very existence of the broad regulatory scheme established by these statues. 
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A. SCHONHOLTZ 
In one of the early cases, a short seller brought claims under section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act against the American Stock Exchange (Amex) 
and a specialist firm, as well as its parent company, based on the allegation 
of losses caused by certain transactions at “artificially high prices created 
by a limited and inadequate supply of Levitz common stock.”11 The 
plaintiff maintained that the exchange “failed to supervise [the specialist 
firm] in the discharge of [its] obligation as a specialist, pursuant to Amex 
Rules, to ‘maintain a fair and orderly market,’ and that [the defendants] 
were under a duty to disclose that the market in Levitz stock was not in fact 
fair and orderly.”12 Dismissing the complaint for its failure to state a claim, 
the district court pointed to deficiencies with respect to detailing how the 
relevant Amex rules were violated and summarized the relevant case law as 
stating that “violations of exchange rules are not per se actionable by 
private parties.”13 On the other hand, the court noted that a “violation of 
some exchange rules might provide the basis for a private cause of action”14 
and “something of a catch-all . . . including merely unethical behavior” is 
unlikely to meet this standard.15 In its turn, the court of appeals concluded 
that, “even if a private right of action otherwise exists for violation of Rule 
170 . . . no valid claim [was] asserted.”16 In its dictum, the court also 
suggested that certain Amex rules may serve as a source of implied 
representations under the federal antifraud prohibition and stated that “at 
most [the Amex and the specialist] represented that all relevant statutes and 
[Amex] rules were complied with; and it is apparent . . . that none of [the 
plaintiff’s] allegations establishes that this representation was false.”17 
B. SPICER 
Another controversy addressed the events in the aftermath of the “Black 
Monday” of October 19, 1987, when several market makers in equity index 
options on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) “did not trade but 
allegedly should have” or allegedly traded at “inflated and grossly 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Schonholtz v. Am. Stock Exch. Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1089, 1090 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 505 F.2d 
699 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 12. Schonholtz, 376 F. Supp. at 1091 (quoting Rule 170 of the Amex). 
 13. Id. at 1091–92. The plaintiff also referred to Rule 177 of the Amex that dealt with the 
specialist’s obligation to report to the exchange “any unusual activity or price change in a security, 
or material information regarding the issue or the market in it.” Id. at 1091. 
 14. Id. at 1092 (citing Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 
1966)). Colonial Realty was decided in the context of sections 6(b) and 15A(b)(8) of the 
Exchange Act that required national securities exchanges and broker-dealer associations to adopt 
rules mandating their members to follow “just and equitable principles of trade.” Colonial Realty, 
358 F.2d at 180.  
 15. Schonholtz, 376 F. Supp. at 1092 (quoting Colonial Realty, 358 F.2d at 182).  
 16. Schonholtz, 505 F.2d at 700. 
 17. Id. at 701.  
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exaggerated prices” and thus “abrogated their responsibility . . . to enter into 
transactions designed to contribute to the maintenance of a fair and orderly 
market.”18 One of the claims was directed at the market makers for alleged 
violations of several CBOE rules under section 6 of the Exchange Act,19 
and, rather surprisingly, there were no claims under section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 “against any of the market makers.”20 The 
rules in question established the general obligation of all exchange 
members not to “engage in acts or practices inconsistent with just and 
equitable principles of trade” and specifically required all market makers to 
engage in transactions that “constitute a course of dealings reasonably 
calculated to contribute to the maintenance of a fair and orderly market” 
and to do so continuously.21 The district court “reluctantly conclude[d] that 
there is no implied right of action under sections 6 or 19 [of the Exchange 
Act] for the violation of an exchange rule.”22 Furthermore, the court 
concluded that, “[w]hether they trade or not, [market makers] do not owe 
fiduciary duties to investors.”23 
By contrast, the court of appeals analyzed the content of the applicable 
SRO rules. Rule 4.1 was described as “nearly identical to the ‘just and 
equitable principles of trade’ rule Colonial Realty held could not support an 
implied private remedy.”24 Rule 8.7(a) was similarly characterized as “a 
vague, ‘catch-all’ standard, whose enforcement Colonial Realty thought 
best left to the exchanges,”25 which still allowed some space for civil 
liability for violations of more specific rules. With respect to Rule 8.7(b), 
the court found no relevant precedent “recognizing an implied remedy 
against an exchange member for anything remotely resembling this 
conduct” and declined to characterize this situation as warranting “an 
implied action for the knowing violation of ‘important, non-discretionary’ 
exchange rules”26 because the relevant precedent was said to be based on 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Spicer v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., No. 88 C 2139, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14469, at 
*1–2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 1990), aff’d, 977 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 19. Spicer, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14469, at *9. More specifically, section 6(b)(5) of the 
Exchange Act required the CBOE to promulgate rules “designed to prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade . . . and, in 
general, to protect investors and the public interest.” Id. (alteration in original).  
 20. Id. at *24.  
 21. Spicer, 977 F.2d at 257, 265 (quoting Rules 4.1 and 8.7(a) and referring to Rule 8.7(b) of 
the CBOE, respectively).  
 22. Spicer, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14469, at *23; see also id. at *9 (“Enforcement of section 6 
is provided for in section 19(g), which states that SROS ‘shall comply . . . and . . . enforce 
compliance’ with their own rules, SEC rules, and applicable statutes.”) (alterations in original).  
 23. Id. at *45. 
 24. Spicer, 977 F.2d at 265 (citing Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d 
Cir. 1966)). 
 25. Id. (citing Colonial Realty, 358 F.2d at 182–83). 
 26. Id. at 265–66 (quoting Bosco v. Serhant, 836 F.2d 271, 278 (7th Cir. 1987)). Bosco 
addressed the issue of a private right of action under the Commodity Exchange Act rather than the 
federal securities statutes. Spicer, 977 F.2d at 265–66; Bosco, 836 F.2d at 274–75. 
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“an entirely different body of case law.”27 Overall, the court affirmed the 
dismissal of the claims brought against the market makers and concluded 
that section 6(b) of the Exchange Act “does not grant an implied private 
right of action to investors who charge that market-makers, or any exchange 
member, violated CBOE Rules 4.1, 8.7(a) or 8.7(b),” while reserving the 
broader issue of whether a private right of action may arise under this 
statutory provision with respect to a violation of any other exchange rule.28 
C. MARKET STREET 
Another case involved claims against the Amex and a specialist firm 
based on an attempt to cancel a sell order for put options on shares of an 
airline company, which was placed through a third-party broker, while this 
order was executed for the specialist’s account after the release of news on 
the collapse of a takeover for another major player in the airline industry.29 
One of the claims against the specialist was brought under section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 for alleged violations of the Amex’s rules 
that “reflect[ed] the unique role given the specialist in directing that a 
member may reject any transaction in which the specialist acted as 
principal”30 and required the specialist to abstain from transactions 
unnecessary for maintaining a “fair and orderly” market.31 While 
considering the motion to dismiss this claim, the court concluded that “[t]he 
facts alleged support the inference that the [specialist] may have violated . . 
. the terms of AMEX Rules 155 and 170”32 and sustained the allegation that 
such violations were a part of the scheme to defraud.33 The court also 
argued that “[t]he specialist has fiduciary obligations closely resembling, if 
not identical to, those of a broker [when he] ‘holds and executes orders for 
the public on a commission basis [and thus is] an agent [with] a fiduciary 
obligation to his principal, the purchaser or seller of stock.’”34 
D. THE NYSE SPECIALISTS’ CONTROVERSY 
The next group of cases, which includes both civil and criminal 
proceedings, dealt with the high-profile controversy over the conduct of 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Spicer, 977 F.2d at 265. 
 28. Id. at 266. 
 29. Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 Civ. 7434, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8065, at *3–8 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993). On the other hand, the specialist “did disclose 
that he took the trade as a principal.” Id. at *31. 
 30. Id. at *33 (referring to Rule 155 of the Amex). 
 31. Id. at *33–34 (referring to Rule 170 of the Amex). The court also took note that this rule 
was based on the corresponding SEC rule and the mandate of the Exchange Act. Id. at *9, *34. 
 32. Id. at *31. 
 33. Id. at *35. 
 34. Id. at *32–33 (quoting Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-5, 42 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 695, 697 (1967)). 
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specialists operating on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).35 One key 
characteristic of the NYSE’s trading architecture at the time was that a 
specialist played the dual role of a dealer and an agent, effectively serving 
as an administrator of the trading process: 
Specialists are responsible for maintaining a two-sided auction market by 
providing an opportunity for public orders to be executed against each 
other. In order to do so, they serve dual-roles, acting as both “agent” and 
“principal.” Once an order has been received, the specialist, acting as 
agent, is required to match the open order to buy with an open order to sell 
within the same price range. Specialists generally receive no compensation 
for filling orders as agents. When there are no matching orders to sell and 
orders to buy, specialists are permitted to trade on a “principal” basis by 
either selling the stock from their own proprietary account to fulfill the 
investor’s order to buy or buying the stock and holding it in their own 
account to fill an investor’s order to sell.36 
Under the NYSE rules, all specialists were subject to the “affirmative 
obligation,” which required them “to buy or sell stock on a principal or 
dealer basis when necessary to maintain a ‘fair and orderly’ market, i.e., to 
minimize any actual or anticipated short-term imbalance between supply 
and demand.”37 Furthermore, the NYSE 
place[d] a negative obligation on specialists, prohibiting “purchases or 
sales of any security in which such specialist, is registered . . . unless such 
dealings are reasonably necessary to permit such specialist to maintain a 
fair and orderly market” [and] prohibit[ed] proprietary trading, with 
limited exceptions, when the specialist “has knowledge of any particular 
unexecuted customer’s order to buy (sell) such security which could be 
executed at the same price.”38 
                                                                                                                 
 35. For the key facts of this multifaceted controversy, see In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 
405 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 503 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007), 
remanded to 260 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Finnerty, Initial Decision Release No. 381, 96 SEC 
Docket 1098 (ALJ July 13, 2009). For academic commentary, see J. Scott Colesanti, Not Dead 
Yet: How New York’s Finnerty Decision Salvaged the Stock Exchange Specialist, 23 ST. JOHN J. 
LEGAL COMM. 1 (2008); Stanislav Dolgopolov, A Two-Sided Loyalty?: Exploring the Boundaries 
of Fiduciary Duties of Market Makers, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 31 passim (2011); Nan S. Ellis et 
al., The NYSE Response to Specialist Misconduct: An Example of the Failure of Self-Regulation, 7 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 102 (2010). 
 36. NYSE Specialists, 260 F.R.D. at 61. The history behind treating exchange specialists as 
agents or sub-agents of public customers is a long one. See Dolgopolov, supra note 35, at 37–39. 
On the other hand, a relationship between an exchange specialist and public customers, which is 
intermediated by other brokers, is by definition not the same as a “real” broker-customer 
relationship. An illustration of a market maker owing the duty of best execution in the context of a 
broker-customer relationship is provided by Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 37. United States v. Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Rule 104 of 
the NYSE). 
 38. NYSE Specialists, 260 F.R.D. at 61–62 (quoting Rules 104 and 92 of the NYSE, 
respectively). For an additional discussion of other NYSE rules relevant in this controversy that 
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More specifically, the defendant specialists were accused of the 
following wrongdoings in connection with their status as market makers: 
(i) “interpositioning” in violation of the Specialist Firms’ “negative 
obligation,” in which a Specialist Firm “steps in the way” of matching 
orders of public sellers and / or buyers of stock to generate riskless profits 
to the detriment of [other market participants]; (ii) “trading ahead” or 
“front-running,” in which Specialist Firms take advantage of their 
confidential knowledge of public investors’ orders . . . and trade for their 
own account as principals before completing orders placed by public 
investors; [and] (iii) “freezing the book,” in which a Specialist Firm 
freezes its Display Book on a stock so it can first engage in trades for its 
own account prior to entering and then executing public investors’ orders . 
. . .39 
Of course, concerns about similar practices of exchange specialists have a 
long history.40 
One of the initial decisions of the district court concluded that the 
plaintiffs had stated a “manipulative scheme claim” based on 
“interpositioning” and “trading ahead” and a claim based on “false and 
misleading statements” under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act with 
respect to the defendant specialists and denied the corresponding motions.41 
In the context of the alleged express false and misleading statements made 
by the defendant specialists “concerning (1) the extent of their efforts to 
minimize the transaction costs paid by their customers in connection with 
the purchase or sale of an otherwise efficiently priced security, and (2) the 
extent to which stocks were bought and sold at market prices, as opposed to 
artificially high and low prices,”42 the court also pointed to the potential 
                                                                                                                 
involved technical aspects of order matching by specialists and general principles applicable to all 
exchange members, see NYSE Specialists, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 291–92. 
 39. NYSE Specialists, 260 F.R.D. at 64. Interestingly, one of the defendant specialists made a 
self-contradicting argument that “the negative obligation sometimes had to give way to the 
affirmative obligation [and] he believed trading ahead was permissible in order to maintain a fair 
and orderly market.” Brief for Defendant-Appellee David Finnerty at 52, 60, United States v. 
Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1104-cr), 2007 U.S. 2nd Cir. Briefs LEXIS 808, at 
*63, *73. Several other defendant specialists similarly argued that, “when necessary to ‘maintain a 
fair and orderly market,’ a specialist has an affirmative legal obligation to trade for its own 
account even at the expense of public orders.” Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Further 
Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Indictment at 8, United States v. Bongiorno, No. 05 Cr. 
390, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24830 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 
33164, at *8. 
 40. See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF 
THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER 33 (1936) (“[W]here 
limit-price orders are concerned, no restriction exists upon the specialist’s power to outbid or 
undersell his customers.”); REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 2, ch. VI, at 92 (1963) 
(“[T]he injection of the specialist in an active stock may lead to investors’ obtaining less favorable 
prices in order to provide for the specialist’s ‘jobber’s turn.’”). 
 41. NYSE Specialists, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 311–17, 321. 
 42. Id. at 318. For specific examples of these express statements, see id. App. B, at 325–33. 
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applicability of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine that addresses the impact 
of misrepresentations and certain omissions on the market price: 
Just as information about a specific security is reflected in the price of that 
security, so too is information about the manner in which transactions 
would be completed reflected in the price of securities generally. Plaintiffs 
may be presumed to have relied upon information indicating that securities 
would be matched by specialists, as opposed to bought and sold at 
artificially high and low prices.43 
Another important point articulated by the court was that, “under 
established principles of agency theory, the specialist firms can be held 
liable for their agents’ Section 10(b) violations if such violations were 
committed within the scope of the agency relationship.”44 In a later 
proceeding, the district court once again asserted that the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine is potentially applicable, as the plaintiffs were presumed to 
rely “on an efficient and fair market,” and extended its analysis to 
“customer expectation in terms of reliance.”45 
Other group of cases considered criminal liability of the defendant 
specialists under federal securities law. One of the initial decisions of the 
district court addressed the practices of “interpositioning” and “trading 
ahead” in the context of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-
5.46 Essentially, the specialists were charged “with intentionally failing to 
obtain best execution by trading for their proprietary account in a fraudulent 
and deceptive manner, and failing to tell the public that they were doing 
so,”47 and the prosecution denied that “a breach of [the defendants’] 
fiduciary duty . . . to execute public trades at the best possible prices [was] 
the sole basis for the charge.”48 Furthermore, the prosecution maintained 
that 
the defendants made implied representations that, among other things, 
they would adhere to their duties as specialists, follow the NYSE rules and 
securities laws, not cheat customers, and not steal from customers. By 
failing to inform public customers that they were ripping them off by 
trading for the specialists’ proprietary accounts before the public, the 
defendants violated section 10(b) [of the Exchange Act].49 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 319. 
 44. Id. at 314. 
 45. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 55, 77–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 46. United States v. Bongiorno, No. 05 Cr. 390, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24830, at *5–6, *9 
(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006). 
 47. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the 
Indictment at 17, United States v. Bongiorno, 05 Cr. 390, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24830 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 1, 2006), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 4325, at *17. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 22 n.7, *22 n.7 (emphasis added). 
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Making a colorful analogy, the prosecution asserted that the practices in 
question 
constituted fraud because defendants were using their position as 
specialists—who can uniquely see both buy and sell orders in advance of a 
trade’s consummation—to profit at the expense of their public customers, 
in the same way that a card dealer would be committing fraud by sneaking 
a peek at the deck and taking the best cards for himself before dealing a 
hand.50 
The defendant specialists advanced the argument that “trading ahead 
and interpositioning at most constitute violations of NYSE rules and 
breaches of their fiduciary duties to public customers, but do not amount to 
violations of the federal securities laws.”51 The defendants further argued 
that “simply repackaging an exchange rule violation as a fraudulent 
omission—by alleging that defendants failed to disclose a rules violation—
does not transform it into a crime.”52 
In its analysis of the reach of all three subsections of Rule 10b-553 to the 
practices of “interpositioning” and “trading ahead,” the court dismissed the 
defendants’ argument that “violations of subsections (a) and (c) that do not 
involve material misstatements or omissions can sustain a conviction only if 
they constitute manipulation,” which was defined by the defendants as 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Bongiorno, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24830, at *15. 
 51. Id. at *10. 
 52. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Indictment 
at 3, United States v. Bongiorno, No. 05 Cr. 390, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24830 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 
2006), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 4324, at *3. A reiteration of this argument stated that 
“[i]t is well settled that violations of exchange rules, without more, cannot serve as the basis for 
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. . . . Accordingly, any notion that defendants 
committed federal securities fraud simply by violating certain NYSE rules is fundamentally at 
odds with this Circuit’s settled law.” Id. at 4, *4. 
 53. Rule 10b-5, which has not been amended by the SEC since its adoption in 1942, provides 
that 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012); see also 
Prohibition of Fraud by Any Person in Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Securities, 7 Fed. 
Reg. 3804 (May 21, 1942). 
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“artificial” market activities that mislead others.54 In fact, the court 
distinguished the terms “manipulative” and “deceptive” and, in turn, 
partially denied the motion to dismiss because the practices of 
“interpositioning” and “trading ahead” could be found deceptive at trial.55 
On the other hand, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with 
respect to subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5, downplaying the prosecution’s 
argument that, “by virtue of their position as specialists, defendants owed a 
fiduciary duty of ‘best execution’ to their public customers [and thus had] 
to disclose that they were improperly trading stocks to and from their own 
account ahead of executable public orders.”56 While the court reserved its 
judgment on the general applicability of the fiduciary standard to 
specialists, the ruling was based on the prosecution’s failure to identify 
“any statements whatsoever made by defendants, let alone any that were 
rendered misleading by virtue of defendants’ omissions.”57 When the 
prosecution moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal with respect to 
subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5, the court disagreed that the “shingle” theory, 
which deals with certain implied representations deemed to be made by 
broker-dealers, was of relevance, but it also emphasized that the ruling “in 
no way contradicted the cases supporting the ‘shingle theory’ of fraud or 
the fact that implied misrepresentations can constitute violations of the 
securities laws.”58 Furthermore, the court dismissed the prosecution’s 
argument that the fact that every individual specialist had signed a form 
kept on record by the NYSE served as “an express statement by that 
defendant that he would follow the rules of the Exchange and that those 
statements were ‘rendered misleading by [the defendants’] failure to 
disclose their improper trading activities’” because such actions were not 
public statements.59 
Another criminal case against one of the defendant specialists also 
addressed the practices of “interpositioning” and “trading ahead” in the 
context of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.60 The district 
court maintained that subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 cover both 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Bongiorno, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24830, at *15–18. 
 55. Id. at *17–21. 
 56. Id. at *17–21, *26. 
 57. Id. at *22–23. 
 58. United States v. Hayward, No. 05 Cr. 390, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37108, at *3–6 
(S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2006). 
 59. Id. at *6–7; see also Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion to 
Reconsider Dismissal of a Portion of the Indictment at 6, United States v. Hayward, No. 05 Cr. 
390, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37108 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2006), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 
4327, at *6 (“[T]he implied representations to the public of fair dealing that are recognized in the 
case law were in fact made expressly by each of the defendants here to the New York Stock 
Exchange and the NASD. These express representations were made repeatedly and in writing as a 
condition of their registration as specialists.”). 
 60. United States v. Hunt, No. 05 Cr. 395, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64887, at *5, *8–9 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006). 
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manipulative and deceptive forms of conduct.61 The corresponding 
conclusion was as follows: 
Defendant’s alleged acts of trading ahead and interpositioning his orders 
in between executable customer orders, which resulted in a profit to his 
firm at the expense of the public, constituted fraudulent devices and a 
course of business that operated as a fraud on the public, in violation of 
Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).62 
The court also granted the motion to dismiss with respect to subsection 
(b) of Rule 10b-5 for the lack of allegations regarding any statements by the 
defendant specialist.63 Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the 
defendant specialists owed a fiduciary duty to other market participants and, 
accordingly, had an obligation to disclose their actual trading practices.64 
On the other hand, the court dismissed the relevance of the defendant’s 
argument that “violations of exchange rules, without more, cannot serve as 
the basis for liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,” arguing that 
“more than a violation of NYSE rules has been alleged [because] his acts of 
trading ahead and interpositioning constituted fraudulent acts perpetrated 
upon the trading public, not mere violations of quasi-regulatory rules.”65 
In another criminal case against one of the defendant specialists, the 
district court similarly treated the practices of “interpositioning” and 
“trading ahead” in the context of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and 
Rule 10b-5. The court concluded that subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 
were applicable, as these practices “worked to deceive the trading public, as 
investors believed that defendants were working to match orders, first and 
foremost, and that defendants traded for their own proprietary accounts only 
to maintain a fair and orderly market.”66 Furthermore, the court pointed out 
that the reach of these subsections goes beyond practices that artificially 
affect market prices, rejecting the argument that “trading ahead and 
interpositioning are not deceptive because they were legitimate transactions 
that took place openly on the NYSE floor.”67 Emphasizing this aspect, the 
court made the following observation: 
Simply because these securities transactions were being recorded on the 
books does not remove them from the realm of deception. If the 
allegations are true, it is apparent that the customers were being misled 
into believing that their orders were being matched, and that their interests 
were being placed above defendants’ interests. Indeed, contrary to 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. at *9–10 (citing Bongiorno, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24830, at *15–16). 
 62. Id. at *10–11. 
 63. Id. at *11–12. 
 64. Id. at *12–18. 
 65. Id. at *21–22. 
 66. United States v. Finnerty, No. 05 Cr. 393, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72119, at *10–11 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006). 
 67. Id. at *11–14. 
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defendants’ argument, the fact that the orders were publicly executed and 
recorded on the books arguably makes these acts even more deceptive, as 
the perception was given that defendants were performing their duties as 
directed by the NYSE and SEC rules.68 
Once again, the relevance of subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5 was 
dismissed because the prosecution had not identified “any statements that 
were misleading” or “any statements that were made misleading by 
defendants’ omissions.”69 The court also declined to accept the 
prosecution’s approach based on implied representations in the context of 
the shingle theory: “[S]pecialists do not actively solicit customers, and 
unlike securities dealers, do not ‘hang[] out [their] professional shingle.’”70 
Given that the prosecution had “proved at [a jury] trial that [the 
defendant specialist] engaged in interpositioning,” the district court later 
considered whether the defendant “engaged in fraudulent or deceptive 
conduct within the meaning of the [federal] securities laws” and concluded 
that it had not been proven at trial that his “[public] customers were misled 
or defrauded or otherwise deceived.”71 The court agreed with the defendant 
that the prosecution “could not prove that interpositioning was deceptive 
without showing what the investing public expected”72 and made a 
corresponding conclusion that, “[w]ithout evidence of what the customers 
expected, no rational juror could conclude that the interpositioning trades 
had a tendency to deceive or the power to mislead.”73 The court 
summarized the relevant precedents as stating that “a violation of NYSE 
rules, without more, is not enough to constitute a deceptive or fraudulent 
act. Evidence that the conduct is deceptive is still required.”74 More 
specifically, the court required a showing that public customers “were 
aware of the rules, expected the specialists to comply with them, and acted 
in accordance with those expectations.”75 The court once again rejected the 
applicability of implied representations in the context of the shingle theory 
because the defendant “did not ‘actively solicit customers,’ and thus, did 
not hold himself out as someone representing the best interests of the 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. at *14–15 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. at *17 (citing United States v. Bongiorno, No. 05 Cr. 390, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24830, at *23–24 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006)); see also id. at *19 (“[T]he Government’s implied 
representation theory for omission liability would also render the text of subsection (b) 
meaningless.”). 
 70. Id. at *19 (alterations in original) (quoting Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 147 F.3d 
184, 192 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 71. United States v. Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The prosecution had 
dropped the “trading ahead” charge in its revised indictment. Id. at 536 n.3. 
 72. Id. at 539. 
 73. Id. at 540. 
 74. Id. at 541 (citing Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)). 
 75. Id. 
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customers.”76 The court also considered a possible characterization of 
“interpositioning” as theft and stressed the pivotal role of a fiduciary 
relation in order to bring the alleged conduct under the umbrella of 
securities fraud.77 The court was quite skeptical with respect to the fiduciary 
status of the defendant specialists, although it concluded that “the existence 
of a fiduciary duty was one for the jury, but the jury was never asked to 
decide the issue.”78 
When the decision of the district court was reviewed on the appellate 
level, it was observed that “‘[c]onduct itself can be deceptive,’ and so 
liability under § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] or Rule 10b-5 does not require 
‘a specific oral or written statement,’”79 but the court qualified this 
observation with the statement that, “[b]road as the concept of ‘deception’ 
may be, it irreducibly entails some act that gives the victim a false 
impression.”80 The court ultimately held that the prosecution “ha[d] 
identified no way in which [the defendant specialist] communicated 
anything to his customers, let alone anything false.”81 The court held that 
“there is no evidence that [the defendant] conveyed an impression that was 
misleading, whether or not it could have a bearing on a victim’s investment 
decision,”82 although it reserved the issue of whether “some form of 
communication by the defendant is always required to prove deception.”83 
The court also took note of the prosecution’s argument that “at least some 
customers were aware of the NYSE rules, would have expected [the 
defendant] to comply with the rules, and were therefore deceived when [he] 
violated them” because these transactions were effected through broker-
dealers holding the NYSE membership,84 but it was also rejected: 
Some customers may have understood that the NYSE rules prohibit 
specialists from interpositioning, and that the rules amount to an assurance 
(by somebody) that interpositioning will not occur. As a consequence, 
some customers may have expected that [the defendant] would not engage 
in the practice. But unless their understanding was based on a statement or 
conduct by [the defendant], he did not commit a primary violation of § 
10(b) – the only offense with which he was charged.85 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 543. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 543–44. 
 79. United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 148–49. 
 82. Id. at 149. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 150. On the other hand, perhaps the meaning of “statement or conduct” for an 
individual employee in the context of criminal liability could be distinguished from the meaning 
of the same phrase for a market making firm in the context of civil liability. 
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Another attempt by the prosecution to craft a theory of liability linked 
to securities fraud—by characterizing the defendant specialist’s “scheme 
[as] ‘self-evidently deceptive’ because he had ‘two critical advantages’ over 
his customers: he could see all pending orders to buy and sell a particular 
stock and he determined the price ultimately paid”86—also failed. The court 
stated that “[i]t may be that [the defendant] unfairly profited from superior 
information. . . . [But] there must be some proof of manipulation or a false 
statement, breach of a duty to disclose, or deceptive communicative 
conduct.”87 The court further observed that “[a] violation of an NYSE rule 
does not establish securities fraud in the civil, let alone in a criminal 
prosecution.”88 Addressing a possible application of the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine, the court stated that the prosecution “ha[d] attributed to 
[the defendant] nothing that deceived the public or affected the price of any 
stock: no material misrepresentation, no omission, no breach of a duty to 
disclose, and no creation of a false appearance of fact by any means.”89 
E. GURFEIN 
Another case involved a complaint against an options market maker for 
its alleged non-compliance with the SEC and SRO rules on firm quotes and 
preferential treatment of certain orders in violation of section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.90 The complaint also lumped together the 
market maker in question with a brokerage firm and an options exchange in 
connection with more general allegations relating to omissions and 
affirmative misrepresentations about the execution practices and 
interference with certain orders.91 The district court found the complaint to 
be inadequate, dismissing it without prejudice with respect to the market 
maker.92 The subsequent proceedings addressed only the claims against the 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 151 (citation omitted). While the court cited no authorities with respect to the 
criminal liability aspect of this pronouncement, the only authority cited in support of the civil 
liability aspect, Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971), appears to 
have a more limited application. With the claim being brought only under section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, the court clearly stated that the “plaintiffs’ claim is nothing more 
than a garden-variety customer’s suit against a broker for breach of contract, which cannot be 
bootstrapped into an alleged violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, or Rule 10b-5, in the 
absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the 
truth, or knowing use of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud.” Id. at 445. The facts and 
allegations in Finnerty do not seem to follow the same pattern. 
 89. Finnerty, 533 F.3d at 151. 
 90. Gurfein v. Ameritrade, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418–19, 424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 91. Id. at 426–27. 
 92. Id. at 428. 
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brokerage firm,93 which left unresolved the reach of a private right of action 
to market-making activities. 
F. LAST ATLANTIS 
Another series of decisions under the umbrella of section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 addressed the allegation that specialists 
operating on several options exchanges engaged in discrimination—
including interference with execution and mishandling—of orders placed 
by direct access customers.94 The plaintiffs described themselves as 
engaged in “a variety of trading strategies, including arbitrage trades, to 
earn profits on short term trades at times they believe that they have 
information and/or technological capabilities that are superior to that of 
Specialist Defendants and other traders in the market.”95 Furthermore, the 
plaintiffs specifically pointed out that, “[b]y electronically submitting limit 
orders and conducting arbitrage trades, Plaintiffs also act as competitors of 
the Specialists, competing with their quoted prices for trades with other 
market participants, thus increasing overall competition for trades in the 
options market.”96 The pivotal allegation directed against the options 
exchanges and specialists under the federal antifraud prohibition was 
pointing at 
a fraudulent scheme and course of conduct pursuant to which each 
Defendant violated SEC Rules and Exchange Rules enacted to protect the 
interests of public investors against the conflicting interests inherent in 
Defendants’ positions as either a specialist permitted to buy and sell 
options as both an agent for public customers and as a principal for its own 
proprietary account, or as a national securities exchange charged with 
ensuring that the members who own, operate and/or substantially fund its 
activities, comply with the SEC Rules and Exchange Rules that, if 
violated, must be enforced by the exchanges against such members. Each 
Specialist also violated the fundamental responsibilities of a specialist, 
which the SEC has held are to, (a) limit their own course of dealings to 
that “necessary to maintain a fair and orderly market,” and (b) fulfill a 
“basic obligation to serve public customer orders over their own 
proprietary interests.”97 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Gurfein v. Ameritrade, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 9526, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75374 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 13, 2006), reh’g granted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51801 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2007), aff’d, 312 
F. App’x 410 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 94. Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. AGS Specialist Partners, 819 F. Supp. 2d 708, 711–12 (N.D. 
Ill. 2010); Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788, 791–92 
(2006). 
 95. Consolidated Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 43, Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. 
Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 04 C 397), 2005 U.S. Dist. 
Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 10704, at *43. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 9, *9. 
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The complaint interpreted the scope of duties of all specialists in the context 
of applicable trading mechanism as follows: 
Each Specialist Defendant, when it undertakes to act as an agent . . . in 
connection with the execution of marketable limit orders . . . legally owes 
its public customers, and thus owed to each Plaintiff, three legal duties: (a) 
a duty of “best execution” to immediately seek and obtain a prompt 
execution at the best reasonably available prices; (b) a duty of loyalty to 
act solely in the interests of its customer in executing the customer’s 
market orders and marketable limit orders; and (c) a duty to fully disclose 
all information material to its execution of the public customers’ (i.e., 
Plaintiff’s) market orders and marketable limit orders, including any 
conflicts of interest.98 
Another central element of the complaint focused on the issue of reliance on 
alleged express and implied representations: 
Each Plaintiff reasonably relied on the express and/or implied 
representations made by each and every Defendant that if Plaintiff sent a 
marketable limit order to any of the four Exchanges, the particular 
Specialist(s) responsible for executing the Order would do so in 
compliance with applicable laws, SEC Rules and Exchange Rules . . . .99 
On the other hand, the plaintiffs also somewhat downplayed the 
significance of SRO rules applicable to all specialists: 
Plaintiffs do not seek to assert an implied private right of action based on 
alleged violations of Exchange Rules. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that by 
engaging in various fraudulent and deceptive acts in violation of the duty 
of best execution—some of which also violated Exchange Rules—each 
Specialist violated Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.100 
Another allegation was that, 
pursuant to the ‘Shingle Theory,’ each Specialist Defendant is legally 
deemed to have issued a pledge to each Plaintiff, by which the Specialist 
represents that, if you submit your marketable limit order to the 
Exchange’s [order execution system] that routes it to us, then we will 
abide by our legal obligations as a specialist.101 
The plaintiffs also pointed to the alleged abuses of trading privileges 
enjoyed by the defendant specialists: 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. at 41, *41. 
 99. Id. at 21, *21 (emphasis added). 
 100. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Specialist Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) & 12(b)(6) at 12, Last 
Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 04 
C 397), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 35415, at *12. 
 101. Id. at 2 n.3, *2 n.3. 
2013] Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World 321 
[E]ach Specialist knows of all the existing orders for [assigned] options, 
including potential order flow that is not yet publicly disclosed. This 
information provides the Specialist with a unique, comprehensive and 
exclusive picture of the overall supply and demand for the market of each 
option it oversees. Because the Specialists hold such a privileged position, 
they are required by law and rules (and have impliedly promised) to place 
their retail customers’ interests ahead of their own. However, each 
Specialist has routinely abused the trust imparted to them by Plaintiffs and 
has used its inside information and exclusive control over the market in a 
given option to trade for its own proprietary accounts ahead of, and to the 
detriment of, the Plaintiffs.102 
Overall, the plaintiffs maintained that their claims were “based upon acts 
alleged to have been taken by the Specialists in their capacities as securities 
brokers designated as exchange specialists, and are not at all based upon 
any acts they may have taken when trading options for their own accounts 
as ordinary market-makers.”103 
The defendant specialists responded that 
the central theory . . . that the Market Makers impliedly represented that 
they would follow Exchange rules and failed to disclose violations of 
these rules, is an impermissible attempt to circumvent the Congressional 
determination that Exchange rules are to be enforced only by the 
exchanges and the SEC, not through private actions. Similarly, plaintiffs’ 
reliance on the inapplicable “shingle theory” is an improper attempt to 
imply a private cause of action where none otherwise exists. Moreover, 
neither fraud by omission nor the shingle theory is viable here because 
plaintiffs have not reposed trust and confidence in the Market Makers, 
who . . . are their competitors, not their trusted advisors.104 
The argument that mere non-disclosure of violations of SRO rules 
applicable to all specialists triggers liability under Rule 10b-5 was also 
attacked: 
If plaintiffs were allowed to state claims merely by alleging that the 
Market Makers did not disclose violations of the rules, any rule violation 
could be turned into a securities fraud case. That result, however, would 
contradict the Congressional judgment that enforcement should be left to 
the SEC and the Exchanges.105 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. at 10–11, *10–11. 
 103. Plaintiffs’ [Corrected] Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Exchange Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) & 12(b)(6) at 6, 
Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(No. 04 C 397), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 35414, at *6 (emphasis added). 
 104. Market Maker Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint at 2–3, Last 
Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 04 
C 397), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 35830, at *2–3. 
 105. Id. at 10, *10. 
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In any instance, the defendant specialists advanced the argument that 
“the only possible fraud rests on the generalized allegation that the Market 
Maker Defendants handled certain orders in violation of exchange rules [but 
the] allegations do not demonstrate rules violations, intentional or negligent, 
by any Market Maker Defendant.”106 
In one of the initial decisions, the district court stated “the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine does not apply to plaintiffs’ claims because plaintiffs do not 
seek recovery for a loss caused by the inflation of the price of an underlying 
security due to the dissemination of misleading information into the 
marketplace.”107 The court clarified that “[the alleged] loss is completely 
independent from, and unrelated to, the underlying value of the option, 
which may or may not have been inflated due to misleading 
information.”108 
Another decision of the district court followed a prior precedent, 
pointing to a similar lack of direct communications between the specialist in 
question and public customers, and concluded that “implied 
misrepresentations under the shingle theory are insufficient to prove 
securities fraud under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).”109 The court also adopted the 
formula that the “plaintiffs must provide evidence of: (1) customer 
expectations, and (2) a deceptive statement or act on the part of the 
specialist.”110 The court observed that the plaintiffs had provided evidence 
that they expected the defendant specialist to “act in accordance with all 
applicable rules when handling and executing the orders [and] relied on [the 
defendant specialist] to execute their orders in a fair and proper manner,”111 
but it nevertheless concluded that the plaintiffs had “fail[ed] to provide any 
proof that the plaintiffs’ expectations were based on the alleged 
misrepresentations made by [the defendant specialist].”112 The court also 
followed another precedent stating that, “under Rule 10b-5(b), the shingle 
theory was not applicable to specialists where the plaintiff failed to put 
forward evidence of misleading statements.”113 Interestingly, the court took 
note of an earlier holding that “not revealing to investors a failure to comply 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Market Maker Defendants’ Reply at 7–8, Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options 
Exch., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 04 C 397), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 
LEXIS 35412, at *7–8. 
 107. Last Atlantis, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 800–01. This statement was made with respect to the 
defendant options exchanges rather than the defendant market makers. Id. at 798. 
 108. Id. at 801 n.16. 
 109. Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. AGS Specialist Partners, 819 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715 (N.D. Ill. 
2010) (footnote omitted) (following United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 110. Id. at 716 (citing Finnerty, 533 F.3d at 150). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. The court also stressed that “[t]he key language . . . states that a customer’s expectation 
‘must be based on a statement or conduct’ by [the defendant specialist].” Id. (quoting Finnerty, 
533 F.3d at 150). 
 113. Id. at 717 (citing United States v. Finnerty, No. 05 Cr. 393, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72119, 
at *16–18 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006)). 
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with one’s duties about transactions in their securities can lead to liability 
under the [federal] securities acts,”114 but it dismissed this analogy—in an 
artificially restrictive way—by stating that the prior case “did not involve 
options specialists.”115 Finally, the court stated that the “[p]laintiffs have 
cited no controlling or persuasive authority suggesting that [the defendant], 
as a specialist, owed plaintiffs a fiduciary duty.”116 
In a subsequent decision, the district court re-articulated the position 
that “specialists, such as the defendants here, are not liable under 
[subsections (a) and (c) of] Rule 10b-5 via the ‘shingle theory’ for implied 
misrepresentations concerning ‘best execution’”117 and stated that a 
showing of express representations is required.118 In connection with 
alleged express misrepresentations and misstatements, the court also 
confirmed the existence of potential liability under subsection (b) of Rule 
10b-5.119 On the other hand, the court rejected the argument that “a promise 
of ‘best execution’ is equivalent to the much broader promise of following 
all applicable rules governing each particular defendant.”120 Furthermore, 
the court dismissed the theory that “the statements at issue [must] be 
specifically directed to these particular plaintiffs,” maintaining that “it is 
reasonable for members of the public who trade in options to rely on 
statements made by options specialists on their public websites.”121 
Similarly, the court rejected the “defendants’ argument that the nature of 
plaintiffs’ arbitrage trading strategy would make it impossible for plaintiffs 
to have relied on any statements by defendants.”122 Finally, the court 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. at 716 n.6 (citing Kurz v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co., 556 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 
2009)). This decision made a specific reference to potential liability stemming from non-
compliance with SRO rules. Kurz, 556 F.3d at 641–42. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 718 (footnote omitted). 
 117. Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. ASG Specialist Partners, 749 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 (N.D. Ill. 
2010). Another key observation was that, “[u]nlike the terms ‘orderly,’ ‘efficient’ and ‘liquid,’ 
which . . . are merely puffery and are too vague to be material, the promise of ‘best execution’ is a 
defined, specific concept in the securities context.” Id. at 834. The court also dismissed as non-
actionable the following statements by the defendant specialists: “[o]ur efforts are always directed 
toward market efficiency and price discovery,” id. at 834–35, “[t]he Specialist also acts as a 
‘broker’s broker’ by taking limit orders into his care and executing them on behalf of the broker 
and customer,” id. at 835, “a specialist has an obligation to maintain ‘a fair and orderly market in 
the securities he trades,’” id., “the company is dedicated to complying with the ‘laws, rules and 
ethical principles that govern us,’” id. at 838, and the specialist keeps markets “liquid, fair, and 
competitive as possible,” id. at 840. 
 118. Id. at 832. One administrative adjudication also came to a similar conclusion with respect 
to a non-specialist market maker. See Herzog, Heine, Geduld, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 
54,148, 88 SEC Docket 1300, 1300 (July 14, 2006) (“Herzog, in its capacity as a market maker, 
assumed the duty of best execution by making written and oral statements to correspondent 
broker-dealer firms to the effect that it would provide best execution to orders routed to Herzog 
for execution.”). 
 119. Last Atlantis, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 842. 
 120. Id. at 833. 
 121. Id. at 834. 
 122. Id. at 841. 
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concluded that the “plaintiffs have failed to put forward evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant[] [specialists] were 
fiduciaries.”123 
II. IN SEARCH OF A COHERENT THEORY OF A PRIVATE 
RIGHT OF ACTION 
A theory of a private right of action with respect to trading obligations 
and privileges of market makers interacts with a host of legal issues, such as 
the shingle theory, the significance of express and implied representations, 
the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, and the reach of fiduciary duties. 
Furthermore, the overarching issue relates to civil liability for violations of 
rules set by trading venues in their self-regulatory capacity, as such rules 
play a big role in establishing the balance of trading obligations and 
privileges of these market participants. 
A. VIOLATIONS OF RULES OF SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS 
The availability of a private right of action for violations of rules of an 
SRO by its members is a pivotal issue,124 given the specificity of many of 
these rules applicable to market makers.125 One categorical point of view—
predominant in more recent cases—is that “[i]t is well established that 
violation of an exchange rule will not support a private claim.”126 On the 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id. at 842. 
 124. For commentary on the availability of a private right in such circumstances, see ALAN R. 
BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD AND 
COMMODITIES FRAUD § 13:62–:71 (2d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2012); NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. 
FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 16.06[A] (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2012); 
Philip J. Hoblin, Jr., A Stock Broker’s Implied Liability to Its Customer for Violation of a Rule of a 
Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 253 (1970); Lewis D. Lowenfels, Implied 
Liabilities Based on Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 12 (1966); Nicholas Wolfson & 
Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 
58 CAL. L. REV. 1120 (1970); Amnon Wenger, Note, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Don’t Get Sued: 
Should a Private Cause of Action Exist for a Violation of a NASD Conduct Rule 3010?, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 303 (2005). 
 125. In connection with market-making activities, the relevance of SRO rules for a private right 
of action is not new. In fact, the issue of civil liability of exchange specialists and exchanges 
themselves in connection with violations of specialists’ trading obligations came up during the 
process of adoption of the SEC’s Rule 11b-1 in 1964, which addressed the affirmative and 
negative obligations of exchange specialists, Regulation of Specialists, Exchange Act Release No. 
7465, 29 Fed. Reg. 15,862 (Nov. 20, 1964). Given the concerns shared by the securities exchanges 
and the regulatory agency, the prevailing view was that the imposition of such trading obligations 
via SRO rules rather than direct SEC regulation would serve as a shield from civil liability. See 
Securities Industry Study: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing & Urb. Affairs 93d Cong. pt. 4, 10–15 (1972) (Staff, Subcomm. on Sec., Comm. on 
Banking, Housing & Urb. Affairs, U.S. Senate, Case Study of the Regulation of Specialists on the 
New York and American Stock Exchanges (1972)).  
 126. In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. 
Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] violation of an NYSE rule does not establish 
securities fraud in the civil, let alone in a criminal prosecution.”); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 
614 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[There is] no Congressional intent to provide a private action 
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other hand, this complex issue may be approached in a number of ways, and 
several cases justify the opposite result.127 The pivotal dividing line in the 
applicable case law is the choice of claims under the federal antifraud 
prohibition or under the provisions of the federal securities statutes that 
govern the process of SROs’ registration, require them to adopt—under the 
SEC’s supervision—certain rules for their respective members, and impose 
mandatory membership in such SROs on broker-dealers, or even under the 
very existence of the broad regulatory scheme established by such statutes 
without necessarily resorting to any specific provision.128 
Characteristic of the early decisions on this matter, one court made the 
following observation on the required analysis of the content of the 
applicable SRO rule in connection with a claim brought under sections 6 
and 15A of the Exchange Act:129 
[W]hether the courts are to imply federal civil liability for violation of 
exchange or dealer association rules by a member cannot be determined 
on the simplistic all-or-nothing basis urged by the two parties; rather, the 
court must look to the nature of the particular rule and its place in the 
regulatory scheme, with the party urging the implication of a federal 
liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when 
the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for 
implication would be strongest when the rule imposes an explicit duty 
unknown to the common law.130 
Another court similarly contrasted the “housekeeping” and “investor 
protection” functions of SRO rules in the context of a claim under section 6 
and 19 of the Exchange Act131 and made the following assertion: “The 
touchstone for determining whether or not the violation of a particular rule 
is actionable should properly depend upon its design ‘for the direct 
                                                                                                                 
for violation of stock exchange rules [and] no implied right of action for an NASD rule 
violation.”). But see Lang v. French, 154 F.3d 217, 222 n.26 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he issue of 
implied rights under stock exchange or dealer association rules is far from settled.”); Leist v. 
Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 338 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[W]e do not necessarily accept the broad language of 
the Jablon opinion.”). 
 127. For two notable recent pronouncements on the appellate level to that effect, see VanCook 
v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130, 141 n.8 (2d Cir. 2011); Kurz v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co., 556 F.3d 
639, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 128. See supra note 10. 
 129. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 180 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 130. Id. at 182. Choosing an indirect path to the availability of a private right of action, the 
court did not see “any reference to exchange rules in the grant of federal jurisdiction over ‘all suits 
in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the 
rules and regulations thereunder’” in section 27 of the Exchange Act. Id. at 181–82. A similar 
textual analysis of section 27 by another court, similarly in the context of a claim under sections 6 
and 19 of the Exchange Act, maintained that, while “the Stock Exchange rules themselves are not 
encompassed by the ‘rules and regulations thereunder’ . . . a violation by a member of the 
Exchange of its rules, filed pursuant to the statute may be actionable as a violation of a ‘duty 
created by this chapter.’” Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 523–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 131. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 141 (7th Cir. 1969). 
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protection of the investors.’”132 The court also argued that “one of the 
functions of [the ‘know your customer’ SRO rule] is to protect the public, 
so that permitting a private action for its violation is entirely consistent with 
the purposes of the [Exchange Act].”133 Another court offered a detailed 
description of the distinction between the “housekeeping” and “investor 
protection” functions in the context of a claim hinging on sections 6, 15A, 
and 19 of the Exchange Act:134 
“[H]ouse-keeping rules” abound—composition and election of the Board 
of Governors, transfers of memberships, dues and other fees, registration 
of floor employees, and back-office procedures—and, generally speaking, 
should not engender private actions by the investing public. Rules 
promulgated by exchanges and securities dealers associations for the 
direct protection of the investing public should, on the other hand, give 
rise to private actions. Under such rules, the investing public is, in a very 
real sense, a third party beneficiary of the duties imposed upon those 
required to adhere to those rules. The “house-keeping rules” confer no 
such status on the investing public.135 
The content-based analysis also addressed the dichotomy between SEC 
and SRO rules and difficulties with separating these two categories. For 
instance, one court stated in the context of a claim brought under sections 6 
and 15A of the Exchange Act that an SRO rule may “play an integral part in 
SEC regulation notwithstanding the Commission’s decision to take a back-
seat role in its promulgation and enforcement, and we would not wish to 
say that such a rule could not provide the basis for implying a private right 
of action.”136 Another court, which analyzed a private right of action under 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. at 142 (quoting Lowenfels, supra note 124, at 29). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678, 680–81 (D. Wyo. 
1975). 
 135. Id. at 683. Several courts have endorsed the “investor protection” rationale in the context 
of claims based on the existence of the broad regulatory scheme without necessarily relying on 
any specific statutory provision. See Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1244 (D.C. Cir 
1978); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 260 (4th Cir. 1975); Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 
854, 858 (10th Cir. 1974); Cook v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 726 F. Supp. 151, 156 (S.D. Tex. 
1989). The counterargument, which reflects the inherent conflict of interest in self-regulation, is 
that  
[p]ublic policy concerns militate against implying private rights of action under the 
NYSE and NASD rules [because] [t]he likely outcome of permitting civil damage 
actions for violations of such rules would be to discourage the stock exchange and the 
dealers association from promulgating rules for the protection of the investing public, 
an undesirable result.  
Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 443 (E.D. Mich. 1983). Another court 
analogously observed that “the self-regulatory bodies must be encouraged to take the initiative in 
exploring and formulating new rules to govern the conduct of their members. Such action is 
doubtful if the promulgation of every new rule has the potential of creating massive liability for 
the members.” Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 136. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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the existence of the broad regulatory scheme,137 even suggested that the 
SRO rule in question may be merely “comparable” to SEC regulation in 
order to trigger a private right of action.138 Linking the broad goals of 
federal securities law and the role of certain SRO rules and pointing to the 
fungibility of SEC and SRO regulation, another court made the following 
pronouncement in the context of the existence of the broad regulatory 
scheme: 
[Certain SRO] rules are promulgated directly for the protection of the 
investing public and regulate the kind of fraudulent conduct to which the 
[Exchange] Act is specifically directed. These rules insure the integrity of 
the securities market, not simply the efficient functioning of exchanges. 
They often serve as substitutes for [SEC] regulations and are vital to 
effective securities control. Implication of a [private] cause of action from 
them is not only permissible, but may be necessary to the success of the 
tripartite system.139 
The court also put this reasoning within the four-prong framework set 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, including the inquiry whether it is “consistent 
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a 
remedy for the plaintiff.”140 Another court similarly pointed to the broad 
goals of the federal securities statutes in the context of a claim hinging on 
sections 6, 15A, and 19 of the Exchange Act: “The protection of the 
investing public is enhanced, not diminished, by permitting a private action 
to be based on [certain SRO] rules; and such actions, where based on such 
explicit rules, further the purposes of these Acts.”141 
Another consideration is the specificity of the applicable SRO rule. As 
one court stated in the context of a claim hinging on sections 6, 15A, and 19 
of the Exchange Act, “A principle with such vague and uncertain contours 
[as being ‘inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade’] could not 
have been intended to give rise to a legal claim for what might merely be 
unethical behavior.”142 Another court similarly contrasted a “broad 
generalized [rule] with vague or uncertain contours that may lend itself to 
variant interpretations” with a “precise” rule, such as the prohibition of 
certain forms of profit-sharing and guarantees against losses,143 arguing that 
“[t]he alleged violations of the [applicable] rules are such an integral part 
of the transaction as to constitute a sufficient claim for violation of sections 
6 and 19 of the Exchange Act.”144 Yet another court indicated that some 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1040–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 138. Id. at 1041. 
 139. Sacks, 593 F.2d at 1244. 
 140. Id. at 1243 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 (1975)). 
 141. Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678, 683 (D. Wyo. 1975). 
 142. Id. at 682. 
 143. Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 144. Id. at 524 (emphasis added). 
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SRO rules, such as those addressing the suitability and supervision 
standards, are “sufficiently precise to sustain a cause of action” under the 
existence of the broad regulatory scheme.145 A close analogy pertains to 
SRO rules regulating disclosure obligations of issuers,146 as opposed to 
SRO members, since information is likely to have a direct and immediate 
effect on the market price as an essential element of every transaction.147 
Putting aside specific judicial tests and lists of factors,148 the content-
based analysis favoring a private right of action in connection with 
violations of SRO rules appears to be relevant for trading obligations and 
privileges of market makers. Although often expressed in technical terms, 
SRO rules governing such obligations and privileges may be classified as 
measures dealing with “investor protection” rather than as “housekeeping” 
rules. Furthermore, SRO rules relating to market making form, to use one 
court’s observation in a different context, “an integral part of the 
transaction.”149 After all, such rules directly address, with the appropriate 
degree of specificity, the transaction protocol for specific counterparties, 
sometimes involving conflict-of-interest issues. Other considerations 
include the notions of “honest” transactions and “fair and orderly” markets 
maintained by market makers, which are relevant for the broad goals of 
federal securities law, and, more generally, the blurry line between SEC and 
SRO regulation. 
On the other hand, the content-based analysis of SRO rules implying a 
private right of action under various provisions of the Exchange Act other 
than section 10(b) or under the mere existence of the broad regulatory 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 146. While considering a claim under sections 6 and 19 of the Exchange Act that a redemption 
notice for convertible debentures was inadequate with respect to the NYSE’s listing agreement, 
one court refused to “take the position that . . . violation of an exchange rule cannot under any 
circumstances give rise to civil liability under the federal acts.” Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 
F.2d 1373, 1379–81 (2d Cir. 1975). A later decision suggested, with some reservations, the 
continuing validity of Van Gemert, but the court declined to recognize a private right for non-
compliance with the NYSE’s Company Manual requiring “to disclose general corporate news” 
under the existence of the broad regulatory scheme because of its broader reach compared to 
“specific notice requirements.” State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 851–53 (2d 
Cir. 1981). Furthermore, the court observed that, unlike the facts in Van Gemert, the relevant rule 
“touches upon areas of corporate activity already extensively regulated by Congress and the 
[SEC].” Id. at 852. On the other hand, the court noted that “the debate in this circuit over whether 
a rule of the Exchange can provide the basis for an implied private right of action is far from over” 
and that the validity of Van Gemert “may be subject to question on the ground that it was handed 
down without benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Cort v. Ash . . . which established criteria 
for implying a private right of action.” Id. at 853 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). 
 147. But see O’Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 770 (2d Cir. 1964) (rejecting the position that “a 
suit against a listed company or its officers based on violation of an Exchange rule arises under 
federal law [under the existence of the broad regulatory scheme]”). 
 148. See, e.g., Hoblin, supra note 124, at 268 (contrasting the “substitution” and “public 
benefit” theories); Wolfson & Russo, supra note 124, at 1135–45 (proposing another theory and 
discussing its applicability to a hypothetical NYSE specialist under several scenarios). 
 149. Starkman, 377 F. Supp. at 524. 
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scheme established by federal securities law is unlikely to meet the muster 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to implying a private right of action. 
In one of the most notable examples of this trend, while addressing a claim 
hinging on sections 6 and 15A of the Exchange Act,150 one court concluded 
that “Congress did not intend to create private rights of action for violation 
of stock exchange rules [and, similarly] there is no implied right of action 
for an NASD rule violation.”151 The court analogized this general principle 
to the contemporary decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that “reflect[ed] a 
restrictive approach to implying private rights of action”152 and indicated 
that the approach based “on the remedial purposes of [Exchange] Act” and 
the jurisdictional grant is no longer viable.153 More specifically, the 
“investor protection” rationale was considered as foreclosed by the same 
decisions on the grounds that the mere fact that certain provisions of federal 
statutes had been motivated by the need to protect certain groups, such as 
securities brokers’ customers or investment advisers’ clients, does not 
necessarily create a private right of action under such provisions.154 In 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679–81 (9th Cir. 1980). While a later case, In 
re VeriFone Securities Litigation, 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993), cited Jablon in connection 
with a broad principle that a “violation of an exchange rule will not support a private claim,” 
stated that “argument that a violation of those rules violates § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] or Rule 
10b-5 amounts to the same thing,” and “declin[ed] to hold that a violation of exchange rules 
governing disclosure may be imported as a surrogate for straight materiality analysis under  
§ 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] and Rule 10b-5,” id. at 870, Jablon was decided under different 
sections of the Exchange Act in connection with civil liability of SRO members rather than 
issuers, as in VeriFone, id. 
 151. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 679, 681. A subsequent case partially relied on Jablon to conclude that 
“[t]he predominant consideration is whether Congress intended to create . . . a private cause of 
action [for violations of SRO rules].” Colman v. D.H. Blair & Co., 521 F. Supp. 646, 653 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). The court also articulated four factors suggesting the absence of congressional 
intent:  
(1) the statutory bases for [SRO rules] . . . do not confer any rights or proscribe any 
conduct by exchange or association members . . . ; (2) there is apparently no mention of 
this subject in the legislative history . . . ; (3) there are several express provisions in the 
[Exchange] Act creating private remedies under specified circumstances, suggesting 
that the failure to provide for private actions for violations of exchange or association 
rules was not an oversight . . . ; and, (4) the statutory scheme provides for self-
regulation and enforcement by exchanges and associations, suggesting that Congress 
has selected this as the exclusive means of enforcement . . . .  
Id. at 653–54 (internal citations omitted). 
 152. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 679 (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 
(1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)). 
 153. Id at 680 (citing Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560; J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)). 
 154. Id. at 680–81 (discussing Transamerica, 444 U.S. 11; Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560). 
Interestingly, a later case, although citing Touche Ross on the issue of congressional intent but 
probably departing from it, provided the following analysis of a claim under the existence of the 
broad regulatory scheme: 
[A] private right of action does exist under the NYSE or NASD rules [because the 
federal securities statutes] were enacted to protect the public from the abuses which led 
to the Stock Market Crash of 1929 [and] Congress required the exchanges themselves 
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contrast to the earlier decisions based on the content analysis,155 Jablon 
declared that section 27 of the Exchange Act “creates no cause of action of 
its own force and effect; it imposes no liabilities. The source of plaintiffs’ 
rights must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 
[Exchange] Act which they seek to enforce, not in the jurisdictional 
provision.”156 Reliance of some of the content-analysis cases on the 
“consisten[cy] with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme”157 is 
also restricted by the subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.158 
On the other hand, violations of SRO rules may still trigger a private 
right of action if appropriately tied with the concept of fraud. More 
generally, one court argued that a violation of an SRO rule “may be 
probative in demonstrating a course of conduct amounting to fraud,”159 and 
another court was even more specific in pointing out that “violations of 
[SRO] rules may be probative of plaintiff’s claims under the antifraud 
provisions of the [federal] securities laws.”160 Indeed, many cases that 
employed the content-based analysis—without connecting it to section 
10(b) of the SEC of 1934 and Rule 10b-5—still stressed the pivotal 
importance of fraud,161 which probably makes any similar claim outside the 
                                                                                                                 
to promulgate rules consistent with the [federal securities statutes]. Congress’ sole 
intent in doing so was to protect the public. 
Woods v. Piedmonte, 676 F. Supp. 143, 145–46 (E.D. Mich. 1987). 
 155. See supra note 130. 
 156. Jablon, 614 F.2d at 680 (quoting Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 577). 
 157. Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1243 (D.C. Cir 1978) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 
422 U.S. 66, 95 (1975)). 
 158. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) (“The intent of Congress 
remains the ultimate issue . . . and ‘unless this congressional intent can be inferred from the 
language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for 
implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.’”) (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. 
Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94 (1981)); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575 (“[In Cort v. Ash] the Court did 
not decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The central inquiry remains 
whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of 
action.”). 
 159. Newman v. L.F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin, 651 F. Supp. 160, 162–63 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (emphasis added) (citing Mauriber v. Shearson / Am. Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 
1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
 160. Kirkland v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 564 F. Supp. 427, 443 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (emphasis 
added); see also Architectural League of N.Y. v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(“Absent facts which demonstrate fraud, independently cognizable under the antifraud provisions 
of the securities laws, violation of NASD rules does not provide an independent basis for 
liability.”). 
 161. See Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 154, 160 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(concluding that “courts have not usually recognized a private right of action for violations of 
exchange rules in the absence of a finding of fraud” in the context of a claim under sections 6, 
15A, and 19 of the Exchange Act); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 
F.2d 135, 142–43 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that “the facts alleged here are tantamount to fraud . . . 
thus giving rise to a private civil damage action” in the context of a claim under sections 6 and 19 
of the Exchange Act); Carroll v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(holding that “a federal private right of action based on an alleged violation of [SRO] rules will be 
implied only when there are well-pleaded allegations of fraudulent conduct on the part of the 
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federal antifraud prohibition redundant.162 As another illustration, the 
content-based analysis may easily be read in the context of the federal 
antifraud prohibition: “The argument may be made that the [broker-
customer] agreements . . . constituted a misrepresentation to the plaintiff 
that they were entirely proper and not in violation of any rule of the Stock 
Exchange and indeed were part of a scheme or device to evade the Stock 
Exchange rules and thereby defraud plaintiff . . . .”163 Furthermore, the 
importance of specificity of SRO rules emphasized by the content-based 
analysis interacts with the concept of materiality under the federal antifraud 
prohibition.164 Overall, not every violation of an SRO rule constitutes fraud 
under federal securities law—or even a direct economic injury that does not 
necessarily come under the umbrella of fraud—but some of such violations 
do rise to that level. Market participants are unlikely to be concerned about 
occasional or even routine violations of many SRO rules, but they often 
effectively rely on specific rules governing the trading process and the 
corresponding conflicts of interest and are injured by opportunistic non-
compliance with such rules. 
                                                                                                                 
defendant” in the context of a claim under the existence of the broad regulatory scheme); see also 
Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating that “each 
court that has considered the question has concluded that mere negligent violations of the NYSE 
or NASD rules are not actionable in federal court; rather, to form the basis for liability in 
damages, the broker’s violations of the rules must be ‘tantamount to fraud’”); Mercury Inv. Co. v. 
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160, 1162–63 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (quoting Hecht v. Harris, 
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (pointing out that the federal securities 
statutes “are essentially directed at fraud – not against mere negligence or errors of judgment” in 
the context of a claim under the existence of the broad regulatory scheme); but see McMillan v. E. 
F. Hutton & Co., 399 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (stating that, “[w]hen the acts 
challenged rise to the level of fraud or some other conduct central to the purpose of the [federal] 
securities acts, then a private right of action on the rule is to be implied” in the context of a claim 
hinging on sections 6, 15A, and 19 of the Exchange Act) (emphasis added) (citing Buttrey, 410 
F.2d 135). 
 162. Indeed, one court mounted a serious challenge to the approach in Buttrey:  
The logic behind [the “tantamount to fraud”] analysis is difficult to comprehend. If the 
violation of a particular exchange rule is to give rise to a private right of action, then 
such a private right of action would seem to exist for all violations of the rule and 
regardless of whether the specific conduct involved appears to be fraudulent.  
Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., No. C-74-2007, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13032, at *21 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 27, 1976) (citing Hoblin, supra note 124, at 267). This approach also offers some support to 
the redundancy of claims outside the federal antifraud prohibition. 
 163. Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
 164. See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 124, § 7:25 (discussing the link between 
specificity and materiality); see also id. § 7:432 (“[R]eliance may be presumed from materiality 
[in the context of a private right of action under the federal antifraud prohibition]. There is some 
judicial acceptance of this view, and it makes sense; once the latter is shown, the reasonably 
prudent investor would be expected to rely.”) (footnote omitted). 
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B. THE SHINGLE THEORY 
As another potential approach, the shingle theory addresses certain 
implied representations deemed to be made by broker-dealers. One 
complication is that the reach of this theory beyond a broker-customer or a 
similar agency relationship is quite uncertain, as different commentators 
have given conflicting descriptions of the shingle theory.165 This theoretical 
dispersion and the corresponding uncertainty regarding the terms 
“customer” and “public investor,” as opposed to any counterparty, are 
evident from descriptions given by cases and administrative 
adjudications.166 The SEC itself recently articulated the position that “[t]he 
shingle theory ‘is not predicated upon the existence of a fiduciary 
obligation’ and applies to all broker-dealer transactions ‘including those 
engaged in as ‘dealer’ or principal.’”167 The regulatory agency also 
maintained that its “formal adjudicatory decisions interpreting the shingle 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Compare Louis Loss, The SEC and the Broker-Dealer, 1 VAND. L. REV. 516, 518 (1948) 
(“This [theory] has nothing to do with any agency obligation. . . . [E]ven a dealer at arm’s length 
impliedly represents when he hangs out his shingle that he will deal fairly with the public.”), with 
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 124, § 13:79 (“The ‘shingle theory’ is based in part on the 
theory that a broker-dealer has, as a matter of federal law, a fiduciary relation to the customer.”); 
and with Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1295–
96 (1995) (“The shingle theory . . . embodies the notion that broker-dealers impliedly represent 
that they will deal fairly, but this implied representation is really a legal fiction. At bottom, the 
shingle theory rests on the premise that a broker-dealer has fiduciary obligations to its 
customers.”). 
 166. Compare Univ. Hill Found. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 898 n.17 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“Under [the shingle theory], when a broker-dealer hangs out his shingle he 
implicitly represents that he will deal fairly with the public.”) (citing 3 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1483 (2d ed. 1961)), and Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 
702, 707 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (“It is now well established that a securities dealer who does business 
with the public, even at arm’s length, impliedly represents that he will deal fairly with the 
public.”) (citing 3 LOSS, supra, at 1483), and Blinder, Exchange Act Release No. 34,095, 52 SEC 
Docket 1145, 1155 (Aug. 26, 1992) (“A broker-dealer, by holding itself out as a securities 
professional with special knowledge and ability, impliedly represents that it will deal fairly, 
honestly, and in accordance with industry standards with the public investor.”), with Bissell v. 
Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 157 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“[C]laim[s] [under] the ‘shingle’ theory [must] arise from affairs entrusted to the broker as a 
fiduciary, agent, or trustee.”), and SEC v. Great Lakes Equities Co., No. 89-CV-70601, 1990 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 19819, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 1990) (“When a broker-dealer hangs out a 
professional shingle it impliedly represents that it will deal with customers thoroughly, honestly 
and in accordance with industry standards.”), and Cea, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-785, 1968 SEC 
LEXIS 2729, at *77 (Hearing Examiner Mar. 11, 1968) (initial decision) (“The [SEC] has 
manifested its serious concern with the fiduciary aspect of the dealer’s role and this has been 
illustrated in its ‘shingle theory’ under which a broker-dealer is held to make an implied 
representation that when he hangs out his ‘shingle,’ he will deal with his customer fairly and 
honestly.”). For a discussion of the evolution of the shingle theory and the implications of the key 
judicial decisions under federal securities law, see 8 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 
ch. 9(C)(1)(a) (4th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 167. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, on Issues Addressed at 
23–24, Capital Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v. Bennett, 670 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 08-6166-cv), 
2009 U.S. 2nd Cir. Briefs LEXIS 56, at *30 (quoting EZRA WEISS, REGISTRATION AND 
REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 171 (1965)). 
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theory, like the [SEC’s] other interpretations of the federal securities laws, 
are entitled to deference in the courts.”168 Yet, overall, there is some 
ambiguity whether this open-ended theory of liability covers the function of 
providing liquidity as such. 
The shingle theory has its origins in administrative adjudications of the 
SEC on excessive markups in the context of a broker-customer 
relationship,169 and this theory relies on the broad principle that “[t]he law 
of fraud knows no difference between express representation on the one 
hand and implied misrepresentation or concealment on the other.”170 With 
the focus on broker-dealer practices, the SEC 
applied the shingle theory in a variety of other instances . . . recogniz[ing] 
that without appropriate disclosure it is a fraudulent practice to sell 
securities at a market price which is materially affected by artificial 
restrictions and stimulations caused by the seller’s own activities, to sell 
oil royalties at prices unrelated to the reasonable value of estimated oil 
recoverable from the underlying tract, to execute transactions not 
authorized by the customer, to sell securities that are subject to a lien, to 
fail to execute orders or deliver securities promptly, or to accept 
customers’ funds while insolvent.171 
Furthermore, from the standpoint of a private right of action in the context 
of the federal antifraud prohibition, it was observed that, 
[a]s with all allegations of fraud under § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act], a 
plaintiff alleging a ‘shingle theory’ . . . must present evidence to satisfy 
four elements: (1) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact; (2) 
made with scienter; (3) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied; and (4) 
which proximately caused the plaintiff’s damages.172 
Another consideration is that specific disclosures may counter the 
assumption of implied representations.173 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Id. at 24, *31. 
 169. See Charles Hughes & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 3464, 13 S.E.C. 676 (July 19, 
1943), aff’d, Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943); Trost & Co., Exchange 
Act Release No. 3345, 12 S.E.C. 531 (Dec. 11, 1942); Duker & Duker, Exchange Act Release No. 
2350, 6 S.E.C. 386 (Dec. 19, 1939). 
 170. Charles Hughes, 139 F.2d. at 437. 
 171. Mac Robbins & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6846, 41 S.E.C. 116, 119 (July 11, 1962) 
(footnotes omitted); see also Starr v. Georgeson S’holder, Inc., 412 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“Although the shingle theory has traditionally been applied to broker-dealers who sell securities 
at a markup, we see no reason not to apply the theory to exchange agents . . . that convert stock 
certificates for a fee.”) (footnote omitted); Gruntal & Co. v. San Diego Bancorp, 901 F. Supp. 607, 
619 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he shingle theory has been employed as an additional means of 
ensuring that brokers have a good faith basis for their recommendations to customers.”). 
 172. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, 132 F.3d 1017, 1034 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 173. See, e.g., Capital Mgmt. Select Fund Ltd. v. Bennett, 670 F.3d 194, 210 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“[When specific] disclosures [are] made in conjunction with a bargained-for agreement between 
sophisticated counter-parties that could be expected to understand the relevant benefits and risks . 
. . there is no liability under the shingle theory.”). 
334 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 7 
While the SEC has endorsed several variations of the shingle theory in 
its administrative adjudications—without using the word “shingle” itself—
with respect to market-making activities of specialists with both dealer and 
agent functions,174 the author is not aware of any case explicitly recognizing 
such an application. On the contrary, one court specifically stated that 
“specialists do not actively solicit customers, and unlike securities dealers, 
do not ‘hang[] out [their] professional shingle,’”175 thus hinting at the 
necessity of a customer-broker relationship. Also with respect to a 
specialist, another court based its decision on the precedent interpreted as a 
“reject[ion] [of] the equivalent of the shingle theory” and a requirement of 
“a statement or conduct.”176 The court also dismissed the argument 
advanced by the plaintiffs that “by hanging out its professional shingle as a 
specialist, [the defendant] impliedly represented to plaintiffs that it would 
follow all applicable rules and that it deceived plaintiffs when it engaged in 
certain actions which violated those rules,”177 stating that the plaintiffs’ 
“expectations that [the defendant specialist] would follow all applicable 
rules [must be] based on statements or conduct by [the defendant].”178 In the 
context of the shingle theory, one court also declined to recognize the 
existence of an inherent duty of best execution owed by a specialist, despite 
                                                                                                                 
 174. See Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,499, 82 SEC Docket 1895, 1895 
(Mar. 30, 2004) (arguing that NYSE specialists make “implied representations to public customers 
that they [are] limiting dealer transactions to those reasonably necessary to maintain a fair and 
orderly market”); Albert Fried & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 15,239, 16 SEC Docket 100, 105 
(Nov. 3, 1978) (arguing that “the [NYSE] specialist impliedly represents that he will not take 
advantage of his unique position and his customers’ ignorance of market conditions nor exploit 
that ignorance to extract unreasonable profits”). On the other hand, the Fleet formula might be 
read as a broader interpretation of implied representations made to potential counterparties in the 
context of specific trading rules, while the Albert Fried formula stresses the nature of the 
underlying relationship with a reference to the original focus of the shingle theory on 
“unreasonable” profits. 
 175. United States v. Finnerty, No. 05 Cr. 393, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72119, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 2, 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 147 F.3d 
184, 192 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 176. Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. AGS Specialist Partners, 819 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715 (N.D. Ill. 
2010) (following United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008)); see also Last Atlantis 
Capital LLC v. ASG Specialist Partners, 749 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (reiterating the 
position that the “defendants, as specialists, were different than other broker-dealers and did not 
fall under the ‘shingle theory’”). The defendant specialists also asserted that, “to the extent the 
‘shingle theory’ has any validity, it only applies to ‘affairs entrusted to the broker as a fiduciary, 
agent, or trustee of the plaintiff’” and that they “were not acting as fiduciaries, agents or trustees.” 
Market Maker Defendants’ Reply at 10, Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 
455 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 04 C 397), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 35412, 
at *10 (quoting Bissell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
However, the court neither relied on Bissell nor examined the dual agent-dealer role of specialists 
in the context of the shingle theory. 
 177. Last Atlantis, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (emphasis added). 
 178. Id. at 717. 
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its dual agent-dealer role, and stated that an express—rather than implied—
representation is required.179 
C. EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPRESENTATIONS 
Another approach addresses express and implied representations made 
by market makers with respect to their trading obligations and privileges in 
the context of the federal antifraud prohibition. This approach complements 
the shingle theory, given the latter’s doctrinal inconsistencies and potential 
restrictions on the nature of the underlying relationship between 
counterparties. The logic of implied misrepresentations is equally 
applicable to “pure” arm’s-length transactions, and, furthermore, it may be 
approached from the standpoint of specific rules and regulations rather than 
the hazier notion of “fair dealing.” 
Regarding express representations made by market makers, the relevant 
inquiry is whether they are actionable in terms of their specificity. One 
decision characterized the defendant specialist’s statement regarding its 
obligation to maintain “a fair and orderly market” as “non-actionable 
puffery,”180 although specific numerical targets and other prior guidance 
provided by trading venues,181 perhaps even in the form of SRO case-by-
case proceedings,182 may reverse this conclusion.183 Similarly, the promise 
                                                                                                                 
 179. Last Atlantis, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 832. According to the plaintiffs, the duty of best 
execution existed independently of various SRO rules applicable to the defendant specialists. 
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Specialist Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
the Consolidated Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) & 12(b)(6) at 12, Last Atlantis 
Capital LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 04 C 397), 
2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 35415, at *12. 
 180. Last Atlantis, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 835. The SEC has provided the following definition of 
“fair and orderly”: “A ‘fair’ market is free from manipulative and deceptive practices, and affords 
no undue advantage to any participant. An ‘orderly’ market is characterized by regular, reliable 
operation, with price continuity and depth, in which price movements are accompanied by 
appropriate volume, and unreasonable price variations between sales are avoided.” Fleet 
Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,499, 82 SEC Docket 1895, 1895–96 (Mar. 30, 
2004). 
 181. For instance, a recent rule adopted by NASDAQ, which addressed the issue of stub quotes, 
refers to a market maker’s obligation to maintain “fairly and orderly markets” in the context of 
specific numerical targets. Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ Stock 
Market LLC To Enhance Quotation Requirements for Market Makers, Exchange Act Release No. 
62,950, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,311, 59,312–13 (Sept. 20, 2010). The SEC’s order approving this rule, 
together with similar rules of other trading venues, similarly pointed out that such measures 
“should promote fair and orderly markets.” SEC’s Release on the Quotation Standards for Market 
Makers, supra note 3, at 69,485. 
 182. As an example, the NYSE has addressed the meaning of “fair and orderly” in the context 
of specific situations in disciplinary proceedings against its specialists. See, e.g., Veenstra, 
Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 07-65, 2007 NYSE Disc. Action LEXIS 64 (N.Y. Stock Exch. 
May 3, 2007); Henderson Bros., Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 99-148, 1999 NYSE 
Disc. Action LEXIS 121 (N.Y. Stock Exch. Nov. 3, 1999); Bocklet, Exchange Hearing Panel 
Decision 99-115, 1999 NYSE Disc. Action LEXIS 92 (N.Y. Stock Exch. Sept. 7, 1999). 
 183. Interestingly, an early decision suggested that the jury instruction on “the duty of 
maintaining an orderly market” owed by exchange specialists, which was based of their function 
336 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 7 
of complying with “laws, rules and ethical principles that govern us” was 
held to be non-actionable.184 Broad—and arguably vague—statements 
about liquidity, efficiency, and competitiveness were also held non-
actionable.185 On the other hand, that same court concluded that “the 
promise of ‘best execution’ is a defined, specific concept in the securities 
context.”186 Given such judicial pronouncements, express representations in 
the form of cautionary statements made by market makers to potential 
counterparties perhaps may serve as an additional shield from liability, 
although such statements are likely to attract the attention of the SEC and 
trading venues. Yet, overall, from the standpoint of practicality, a lengthy 
duplication of numbers-heavy trading obligations and privileges of market 
makers in express representations, including disclosure documents, seems 
problematic, although there could be an SRO or SEC rule requiring a 
special disclosure incorporating such terms by reference. 
A much broader reach of a private right of action depends on the 
actionability of implied representations deemed to be made by market 
makers. One court left some room for this approach in the context of 
trading rules specifically applicable to market-making activities.187 Drawing 
support from a context other than market making and under a different 
provision of the Exchange Act, another court stated that several broker-
customer agreements “constituted a misrepresentation to the plaintiff that 
they were entirely proper and not in violation of any rule of the Stock 
Exchange.”188 This language corresponds to the logic of implied 
representations and might be taken even further to cover arm’s-length 
transactions. Furthermore, one recent decision held—with a specific 
reference to subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5—that “the implied 
misrepresentation that [an introducing broker’s employee] made by 
engaging in late trading [contrary to the prohibition on late trading in 
mutual fund prospectuses, the clearing broker’s instruction manual, and 
SEC regulation] . . . violate[s] Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) [of the 
                                                                                                                 
of “‘maintain[ing] a fair and orderly market” referenced in section 11(b) of the Exchange Act 
itself, may be sufficiently specific in the criminal context. United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306, 314–
15 (2d Cir. 1964). By contrast, a recent administrative adjudication stated that section 11(b) of the 
Exchange Act and the corresponding SEC rule, which employ the “fair and orderly” language, 
“do[] not place any requirements directly on specialists, and thus cannot be violated by 
specialists.” Finnerty, Initial Decision Release No. 381, 96 SEC Docket 1098, 1034–35 (ALJ July 
13, 2009). On the other hand, section 11(b) of the Exchange Act was amended after 1964 in a way 
that deemphasized direct statutory regulation of exchange specialists. Compare Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891, with Securities Acts 
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 6(2), 89 Stat. 97, 111. 
 184. Last Atlantis, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 
 185. See supra note 117. 
 186. Last Atlantis, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 834. 
 187. Schonholtz v. Am. Stock Exch. Inc., 505 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 188. Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
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Exchange Act].”189 Although VanCook distinguished Finnerty by stating 
that the defendant “did not merely violate an NYSE rule that customers 
might or might not have expected him to follow; he violated the mutual 
funds’ own express wishes, as set out in their prospectuses,”190 the 
difference from the perspective of mutual fund investors is not as apparent. 
D. THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET DOCTRINE 
Another potential theory of liability in the context of the federal 
antifraud prohibition is the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, which deals with 
the impact of misrepresentations and certain omissions on the market 
price.191 In fact, this doctrine reaches beyond fundamental information 
about underlying companies: “Just as information about a specific security 
is reflected in the price of that security, so too is information about the 
manner in which transactions would be completed reflected in the price of 
securities generally.”192 The reach of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine was 
also recognized in a related case, in which the actions of an options 
exchange, a clearinghouse, and options market makers allegedly led to 
inflated prices: “A successful scheme to charge excessive prices across the 
                                                                                                                 
 189. VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2011); see also SEC v. Pentagon Capital 
Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (arguing that the defendants’ “submission 
of late-trade orders constituted a fraudulent device and an implied misrepresentation in violation 
of Rule 10b-5(b) because it suggested that final orders were received before the funds’ 4:00 p.m. 
pricing time, as reflected in the applicable [mutual fund] prospectus language, when, in fact, the 
trading decisions were made after 4:00 p.m.”). Both VanCook and Pentagon also found the 
respective defendants liable on the basis on subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5. VanCook, 653 
F.3d at 138; Pentagon, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 422. Although one of these cases cautioned against 
analogizing private and SEC actions under Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 
131 U.S. 2296 (2011), in the context of subsection (b), Pentagon, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 421–22, 
Janus focused on the distinction between primary and secondary violators and the meaning of the 
word “make” in connection with express statements. These issues would be largely irrelevant in a 
hypothetical involving a market maker’s implied representations. Furthermore, while drawing any 
conclusions from SEC-initiated lawsuits for private lawsuits in connection with the federal 
antifraud prohibition is limited by the fact that the regulatory agency “does not need to prove 
investor reliance, loss causation, or damages”, the SEC still has to show “a material 
misrepresentation or a material omission as to which [the defendant] had a duty to speak, or  . . . a 
fraudulent device; with scienter.” SEC v. BankCorp, Ltd., 195 F. Supp. 2d 475, 490–91 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). This requirement appears to be relevant for private lawsuits. As stated by another court, 
“Judicial decisions defining the conduct necessary to constitute a Rule 10b-5 violation do apply to 
actions by the SEC as well as private parties.” Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 
1993); see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (“[S]cienter is an element of a violation 
of § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the 
nature of the relief sought.”). 
 190. VanCook, 653 F.3d at 140. 
 191. For a brief survey of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine by the author, see Stanislav 
Dolgopolov, Risks and Hedges of Providing Liquidity in Complex Securities: The Impact of 
Insider Trading on Options Market Makers, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 387, 428–31 (2010). 
 192. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 2d 281, 318–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In a 
later proceeding, the same court once again asserted that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine may be 
applicable, as the plaintiffs were presumed to rely “on an efficient and fair market.” In re NYSE 
Specialists Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 55, 77–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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market and not to disclose that fact affects the integrity of market prices as 
surely as any scheme to spread false information about corporate prospects 
that affects the price only of a single issuer’s stock.”193 
On the other hand, the problem with fitting this doctrine lies in the 
difficulty of tracing a link to trading obligations and privileges of market 
makers, as they are more likely to determine terms of transactions around 
some “fundamental” price rather than that price itself. In the similar context 
of civil liability of trading venues, one court concluded that “the fraud-on-
the-market doctrine does not apply [when] plaintiffs do not seek recovery 
for a loss caused by the inflation of the price of an underlying security due 
to the dissemination of misleading information into the marketplace.”194 
Another judicial pronouncement also addressed potential complications 
with demonstrating a causal link necessary for the application of the fraud-
on-the-market doctrine to a market maker: “[T]he Basic Inc. presumption of 
reliance arises where a civil plaintiff can point to ‘public, material 
misrepresentations’ that impugned the integrity of a stock’s market price. 
Here, the government has attributed to [the defendant specialist] nothing 
that . . . affected the price of any stock . . . .”195 
E. THE REACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Generally, the federal courts have been very skeptical about imposing a 
broad fiduciary duty on market makers—including specialists, despite their 
agency-like functions—with respect to other market participants, and this 
concept is problematic, if not openly impractical, on both doctrinal and 
public policy levels.196 A typical statement on the application of the 
fiduciary standard—in the context of the NYSE’s specialist system—
maintained that, “[w]hile specialists may have an obligation to maintain the 
market economy, they do not owe the public a fiduciary duty [and] have no 
loyalty to buyers or sellers, as they execute orders for both, and further, 
they often do not know the identity of those for whom they execute buys 
and sells.”197 On the other hand, one court mentioned in a dictum that the 
market maker status—the role that the defendant in fact had not played—
                                                                                                                 
 193. Spicer v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., No. 88 C 2139, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14469, at 
*35 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 1990). 
 194. Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., 455 F. Supp. 2d 788, 800–01 (2006); 
see also Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 175–76 (2d Cir. 
2001) (stating that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine does not apply to claims for a broker’s 
breaches of the duty of best execution because they “do not involve an omission or 
misrepresentation that affected the value of a security in an efficient market”). 
 195. United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted) 
(quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988)). 
 196. See generally Dolgopolov, supra note 35. 
 197. United States v. Hunt, No. 05 Cr. 395, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64887, at *16–17 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 6, 2006). 
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“implicate[s] broader fiduciary duties,”198 and one recent decision left some 
room for “a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on an agency theory” 
with respect to options specialists with both agent and dealer functions.199 
In any instance, a fiduciary relation, by definition, implies more than just 
formalistic compliance with various trading rules, although non-compliance 
with such rules may serve as proof of a violation of one’s fiduciary duty in 
the context of the federal antifraud prohibition.200 
F. PUTTING THE PIECES OF THE PUZZLE TOGETHER 
The most recent strain of the case law directly dealing with a private 
right of action for violations of trading obligations and abuses of trading 
privileges of market makers—exemplified by Finnerty and Last Atlantis—
took the path of a very restrictive interpretation of “statement or conduct” 
that approximates the necessity of demonstrating an explicit statement 
addressed to other market participants and precludes the applicability of 
implied representations or, alternatively, many conduct-based approaches in 
the context of the federal antifraud prohibition. Another characteristic of 
this line of cases is its near-blanket rejection of civil liability for violations 
of SRO rules rather than treating such violations as a trigger for further 
inquiry. Therefore, the fundamental question pertains to the reach of a 
private right of action beyond express representations and disclaimers made 
by such market participants as a potential means of addressing their 
opportunistic behavior. 
In the author’s view, creating an appearance or “false impression”201—
by the virtue of functioning as a formal market maker—that transactions are 
to be consummated in accordance with the applicable SRO and other rules 
that define specific parameters of such transactions, especially if non-
compliance with such rules is not disclosed, could be classified as deceptive 
conduct and/or implied misrepresentations within the reach of the antifraud 
prohibition under federal securities law, for which a private right of action 
is readily available.202 Furthermore, this approach should have a more 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Arst v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 86 F.3d 973, 980 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 199. Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. ASG Specialist Partners, No. 04 C 397, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 60380, at *10 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2011). 
 200. Of course, a mere breach of fiduciary duty without “any deception, misrepresentation, or 
nondisclosure” does not give rise to liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 
10b-5. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). 
 201. Finnerty used the concept of “false impression,” but it was held to be non-applicable to the 
facts under consideration. United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2008) 
 202. One limitation is that non-consummated transactions in violation of trading obligations of 
market makers are likely to be outside the purview of the federal antifraud prohibition under Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). A potential avenue for addressing such 
claims is the state law of contracts—especially if the market maker in question also performs 
brokerage functions—but there are certain limitations as well. See Gurfein v. Ameritrade, Inc., 
312 F. App’x 410, 413–14 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that a mere acknowledgement that 
transactions are to be governed by the applicable SRO rules in an agreement between a brokerage 
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general applicability, given the limitations of the shingle theory, the fraud-
on-the-market doctrine, and the reach of fiduciary duties. More generally, 
putting away the distinction between market makers and other market 
participants, it is problematic to expect a potential counterparty in an 
impersonal market to make an express representation as to the adherence to 
certain or even all rules relating to the trading process and determining 
material characteristics of the transaction in question—especially if such 
rules are publicly available and adopted or vetted by regulators. As one case 
insightfully observed, market makers give “the perception [that they are] 
performing their duties as directed by the [SRO] and SEC rules.”203 The 
requirement of an express representation may be also impractical if such 
rules are multilayered and complex. Another consideration is that conscious 
non-compliance with certain trading rules by market makers often has a 
wealth redistribution effect vis-à-vis other market participants. 
A near-blanket ban on a private right of action in connection with 
violations of SRO rules, as adopted by several courts, is perhaps misguided. 
Some of SRO rules applicable to market makers define the nature of the 
trading process and, accordingly, some of the essential characteristics of 
individual transactions. In other words, such rules go beyond the self-
regulatory maintenance of professional ethical standards. One approach is 
to re-characterize violations of SRO rules not as harmful acts per se but as a 
part of deceptive conduct and/or implied misrepresentations within the 
reach of the federal antifraud prohibition.204 This approach would neither 
open the door too wide—for instance, for violations caused by mere 
negligence or failures of the trading infrastructure itself—nor immunize 
certain types of securities fraud under the existing regulatory framework. 
The reach of the federal antifraud prohibition  is especially relevant when 
                                                                                                                 
firm and its customer “does not incorporate into the contract the rules and regulations of those 
outside regulatory bodies [or] impose any contractual obligations on [the brokerage firm]”); 
Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., No. 08-CV-7130, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104594, at 
*10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2009) (finding that a similar language in an agreement between a brokerage 
firm and its customer “does not appear to contractually obligate [the brokerage firm] to abide be 
[sic] NASD and NASDAQ rules”). An even tighter interpretation adopts the position that “the 
ability to enforce such [SRO] regulations through a state law contract action . . . would fail even if 
the plaintiffs could have produced supportive [contractual] language.” Appert, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 104594, at *9 (interpreting Kurz v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co., 556 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 
2009)). 
 203. United States v. Finnerty, No. 05 Cr. 393, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72119, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 2, 2006) 
 204. This position has been suggested by several courts in the context of market making 
activities. See United States v. Hunt, No. 05 Cr. 395, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64887, at *21–22 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006); Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 Civ. 7434, 
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8065, at *35 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993); see also Government’s 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Indictment at 21–22, 
United States v. Bongiorno, 05 Cr. 390, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24830 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006), 
2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 4325, at *21–22 (analyzing the connection between violations 
of SRO rules and manifestations of fraud and stating that violations of “NYSE trading rules [was] 
not the sole basis for the charges” in the NYSE specialists’ controversy). 
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such violations remain undetected, illustrated by the alleged misconduct of 
the NYSE specialists, as opposed to a flat-out refusal to follow a specific 
rule by not entering into a transaction. While a market maker’s transaction 
is likely to be transparent in terms of its specificity and correspond to 
economic reality even when certain SRO rules are violated, that 
transaction’s alternative terms  may not be transparent.205 Furthermore, even 
broadly worded SRO rules applicable to market makers may potentially 
have teeth in terms of their specificity in some situations.206 
A recent appellate decision also offers a powerful argument supporting 
a private right of action in the context of SRO rules: 
NASD’s rules themselves are part of the apparatus of federal securities 
regulation. NASD is a “self-regulatory organization”; its requirements are 
adopted by notice-and-comment rulemaking (not by the mechanism of 
contract, which requires consent by all affected persons) and are subject to 
review and change by the SEC. Some of these rules are the source of legal 
duties, and not revealing to investors a failure to comply with one’s duties 
about transactions in their securities can lead to liability under the 
[federal] securities acts.207 
An even more recent appellate decision specifically reconsidered its own 
precedent and articulated the position that a market maker’s non-
compliance with trading rules constitutes “deceptive conduct”: 
[A]s the [SEC] notes, we decided Finnerty before the SEC had issued any 
“interpretation to which Chevron deference was required regarding the 
deceptive nature of interpositioning by an NYSE specialist.” The 
Commission has since issued a formal adjudicatory decision on the 
subject, concluding that, inter alia, by becoming a specialist “Finnerty 
expressly represented to the NYSE that he would comply with its rules” 
and that “[b]y engaging in undisclosed interpositioning and trading ahead 
in contravention of [his] duties and representations . . . Finnerty engaged 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See also id. at 15–16, *15–16 (“The specialist’s ability to unilaterally determine the 
specific price of every executed trade demonstrates that he has discretion – indeed control – over 
the most important aspect of a securities trade, the price.”). 
 206. Although decided in the context of an SRO disciplinary action against one of its members, 
some guidance is offered by Shultz v. SEC, 614 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1980), in which the “charges 
were based on a series of circular transactions engaged in by [several] market makers [that] left 
each in exactly the same position he had been in prior to the trades,” id. at 564. In these 
circumstances, the SRO rule requiring market makers’ transactions to be “reasonably calculated to 
contribute to the maintenance of a fair and orderly market,” id. at 571, was deemed to give 
“sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common 
understanding and practices,” id. (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)). In a 
later decision, however, the same court characterized the same SRO rule as “a vague, ‘catch-all’ 
standard” with respect to a private right of action in the circumstances involving a market crash. 
Spicer v. Chi. Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 977 F.2d 255, 265 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 207. Kurz, 556 F.3d at 641–42. 
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in deceptive conduct.” . . . This later interpretation of Rule 10b-5 “trumps” 
our prior interpretation in Finnerty.208 
The articulation of this principle specifically in the context of SRO rules 
was further reinforced by the pronouncement that “‘[c]onduct itself can be 
deceptive,’ and liability under Section 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] and 
Rule 10b-5 does not require ‘a specific oral or written statement.’”209 
Expanding the availability a private right of action even further, a 
creative argument based on a presumption of the integrity of the trading 
process as compliance with all relevant rules—similar to the presumption 
of “the integrity of the market price” as the cornerstone of the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine210—perhaps could resonate with the federal courts in order 
to address the problem of violations of trading obligations and abuses of 
trading privileges of market makers and avoid the necessity of proving 
reliance on specific rules. After all, market participants’ reliance on the 
adherence to applicable trading rules by market makers does not necessarily 
imply the comprehension of every single rule by a potential plaintiff. In any 
instance, demonstrating reliance is not an insurmountable obstacle,211 and 
trading algorithms themselves may potentially serve as evidence. 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHANGING ECONOMICS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF PROVIDING LIQUIDITY 
IN SECURITIES MARKETS AND RELATED REGULATORY 
DEBATES 
A discussion of a potential private right of action with respect to trading 
obligations and privileges of market makers also requires analyzing the 
changing economics and institutional framework of providing liquidity and 
                                                                                                                 
 208. VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130, 140 n.8 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Finnerty, Securities Act 
Release No. 9033, Exchange Act Release No. 59,998, 95 SEC Docket 2534, 2535 (May 28, 
2009)). The administrative adjudication specifically based its demonstration of deceptive conduct 
on the assertion that “absent disclosure to the contrary by [the specialist], those who submitted 
orders executed by him . . . were entitled to believe that he would execute their orders in a manner 
consistent with [his] duties [including those set by the applicable NYSE rules].” Finnerty, 95 SEC 
Docket at 2535. Still, this decision of the SEC was a settlement “not binding on any other person 
or entity.” Id. at 2534 n.1. The judicial pronouncement in VanCook is also relevant for the SEC’s 
endorsement of the related but distinct theory of liability based on implied representations with 
respect to an exchange specialist, which, however, was also settlement-based. See, e.g., Fleet 
Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 49,499, 82 SEC Docket 1895, 1895 (Mar. 30, 2004). 
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has “expressed skepticism over the degree to which 
the SEC should receive deference regarding the private right of action.” Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. 
First Derivative Traders, 131 U.S. 2296, 2302 n.8 (2011) (citing Piper v. Chris–Craft Indus., Inc., 
430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1977)). 
 209. VanCook, 653 F.3d at 141 (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008)). Interestingly, the same passage was quoted in United States v. 
Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2008), but with a different outcome. 
 210. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
 211. See, e.g., Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. AGS Specialist Partners, 819 F. Supp. 2d. 708, 716 
(N.D. Ill. 2010). 
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related regulatory debates. One factor pertains to the changes that have 
already taken place, such as adjustments in the status of market makers and 
the balance of their trading obligations and privileges. Another factor 
concerns the rise of high-frequency trading and its role in providing 
liquidity in an informal fashion, as well as conflicts between certain high-
frequency traders and formal market makers. Finally, kaleidoscope-like 
changes in securities markets have produced heated regulatory debates on 
trading obligations and privileges of market makers. 
A. THE PROCESS OF “DEAGENTIZATION” OF MARKET MAKING AND 
OTHER CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF TRADING OBLIGATIONS 
AND PRIVILEGES 
The regulatory framework applicable to market makers has already 
undergone a number of key changes in recent years. One notable 
development is that some trading venues are abandoning the model in 
which formal market makers serve as agents or quasi-agents. This 
development is exemplified by the decision of the NYSE not to charge its 
“designated market makers,” specialists’ replacements, with “the 
specialist’s agency responsibilities with respect to orders on the Display 
Book,”212 and “supplemental liquidity providers,” an additional class of 
liquidity providers on the NYSE, similarly do not “act on an agency 
basis.”213 The fact that the specialist, i.e., agent-dealer, model of market 
making is supplanted by the dealer-only model makes irrelevant certain 
trading obligations related to agency functions, such as order matching 
procedures. As some of the cases directed against market makers addressed 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC To Create a 
New NYSE Market Model, Exchange Act Release No. 58,845, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,379, 64,389 (Oct. 
24, 2008). For similar measures adopted by other trading venues, see Order Approving a Rule 
Change by American Stock Exchange LLC To Eliminate Options Specialists’ Agency 
Responsibilities and Establish Amex Book Clerks, Exchange Act Release No. 56,804, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 66,002 (Nov. 16, 2007); Order Approving a Rule Change by Chicago Board Options 
Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Removal of Agency Responsibilities from Designated Primary 
Market-Makers and the Establishment of PAR Officials, Exchange Act Release No. 52,798, 70 
Fed. Reg. 71,344 (Nov. 18, 2005). 
 213. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC for a Pilot 
Program To Establish a New Class of NYSE Market Participants That Will Be Referred to as 
“Supplemental Liquidity Providers,” Exchange Act Release No. 58,877, 73 Fed. Reg. 65,904, 
65,904 (Oct. 29, 2008). Interestingly, the NYSE has recently added a new subclass of 
supplemental liquidity providers that are able to transact “in either a proprietary capacity or a 
principal capacity on behalf of an affiliated or unaffiliated person [including] on behalf of 
customers.” Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC To 
Add a Class of Supplemental Liquidity Providers That Are Registered as Market Makers at the 
Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 67,154, 77 Fed. Reg. 35,455, 35,456 (June 7, 2012). 
However, this arrangement is still very different from the old specialist model based on the 
“broker’s broker” paradigm. 
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their agency functions,214 among other issues, the disappearance of these 
functions also narrows the area for a private right of action. 
Another key development is that “changes in the business models of 
many exchanges and advancements in technology have eliminated or 
reduced the value of the special time and place privileges traditionally 
enjoyed by specialists and registered market makers.”215 As an illustration, 
the NYSE recently eliminated the “advance ‘look’ at incoming orders,” 
which was previously available to specialists, for designated market 
makers,216 although the feasibility of trading arrangements without 
informational advantages of exchange specialists had been articulated a 
long time before that.217 The accompanying increase in transparency of the 
trading process also precludes certain types of questionable conduct by 
market makers—exemplified by NYSE Specialists—that are potentially 
actionable. 
Another notable development is the abolition of the “negative 
obligation,” which is illustrated by the NYSE’s decision not to subject its 
designated market makers to “a specialist’s negative obligation not to trade 
for its own account unless reasonably necessary to the maintenance of a fair 
and orderly market.”218 This measure similarly narrows the area for a 
                                                                                                                 
 214. See, e.g., Last Atlantis Capital LLC v. ASG Specialist Partners, No. 04 C 397, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 60380, at *10 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2011); In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. 
Supp. 2d 281, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 215. Letter from Greg Tusar, Managing Dir., Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P., & 
Matthew Lavicka, Managing Dir., Goldman Sachs & Co., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 (June 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-
10/s70210-243.pdf. Market makers also lost some valuable regulatory exemptions, which, 
however, had only a remote connection to a potential private right of action. For instance, the SEC 
has declined to provide certain exemptions for market makers in connection with short-selling 
activities despite the argument made by many representatives of the securities industry that this 
measure would have an adverse market-wide effect. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange 
Act Release No. 61,595, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,232, 11,271–75 (Feb. 26, 2010) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 242). 
 216. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC To Create a 
New NYSE Market Model, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,389. Even under the NYSE’s “Hybrid Market,” the 
previous trading system, specialists had “access to certain information before other market 
participants, and [were] permitted to make a range of specified quoting and trading decisions 
based on that information.” Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock 
Exchange LLC To Establish the Hybrid Market, Exchange Act Release No. 53,539, 71 Fed. Reg. 
16,353, 16,363 (Mar. 22, 2006). 
 217. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Toward a Fully Automated Stock Exchange (pt. 2), FIN. 
ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1971, at 24, 26 (“The book of straight limit orders could be made public 
(without identifying who placed each order). Thus the specialist would not have this type of 
information to himself, and the cost of handling such orders could be sharply reduced.”); Eugene 
F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 399 
n.22 (1970) (“It does not seem technologically impossible to replace the entire [trading] floor . . . 
with a computer, fed by many remote consoles, that kept all the books now kept by specialist, that 
could easily make the entire book on any stock available to anybody (so that interested individuals 
could then compete to ‘make a market’ in a stock) . . . .”). 
 218. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC To Create a 
New NYSE Market Model, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,380; see also Order Approving a Proposed Rule 
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private right of action. The justification for this restriction’s existence used 
to be straightforward: “The basic principles of the negative obligation [and] 
underlying regulatory objectives [are] to curtail the potential for speculative 
or abusive trading and to mitigate the specialist’s information advantages 
and inherent conflicts of interest when permitted to act as both broker and 
dealer.”219 Of course, given the disappearance of many key privileges of 
market makers, it is much harder to rationalize the existence of the negative 
obligation for many trading venues.220 
Another key development is the push to abolish “stub” quotes, i.e., 
placeholder quotes setting up unreasonably wide spreads with deliberately 
unattractive prices,221 and this regulatory measure could be seen as a market 
stabilization tool. Stub quotes were banned by several trading venues as a 
part of more stringent quotation standards for market makers in the 
aftermath of the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010.222 This measure was adopted 
“in coordination” with the SEC,223 and, in fact, the regulatory agency 
started “consider[ing] steps to deter or prohibit the use by market makers of 
‘stub’ quotes” on its own shortly after this market breakdown.224 On the 
other hand, the ban on stub quotes is not a panacea from the standpoint of 
its effectiveness,225 and, indeed, some evidence suggests that violations of 
                                                                                                                 
Change by NYSE Amex LLC Extending the Operation of Its New Market Model Pilot, Exchange 
Act Release No. 60,758, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,639, 51,640 (Oct. 1, 2009) (stating that designated 
market makers “no longer have a negative obligation”). 
 219. Simon & Trkla, supra note 3, at 225. 
 220. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange LLC To 
Create a New NYSE Market Model, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,382 (“Given the real-time availability of 
market information and resultant increase in market transparency in today’s markets and the 
[NYSE’s] proposed elimination of the advance ‘look’ at incoming orders by the [designated 
market makers], the [NYSE] believes that the imposition of a negative obligation . . . is 
unnecessary.”). In addition to the abolition of the negative obligation on the NYSE, designated 
market makers were also given the right to “receive executions on an equal basis . . . with other 
interest available at that price.” Id. at 64,380. 
 221. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS 
OF MAY 6, 2010, at 38 (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies 
/2010/marketevents-report.pdf (“In order to comply with their obligation to maintain continuous 
two-sided quotations, market makers utilize stub quotes if they choose to discontinue actively 
quoting.”). But see Steve Wunsch, Straitjacket, Part 2: The Role of Stop-Loss Orders and Stub 
Quotes on May 6, TABB FORUM (Jan. 31, 2011), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/straitjacket-part-
2-stop-loss-orders-and-stub-quotes (registration required) (“Stub quotes likely arose out of the 
regulatory conflict between a stubborn SEC insisting on continuous two-sided quoting and the 
business needs of exchanges and their liquidity suppliers trying to sidestep this non-productive 
requirement.”). 
 222. SEC’s Release on the Quotation Standards for Market Makers, supra note 3. 
 223. Id. at 69,484 
 224. Examining the Causes and Lessons of the May 6th Market Plunge: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 
54 (2010) (prepared statement of Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission). 
 225. See Michael Shashoua, Flash Flood, WATERS, Nov. 2010, at 34, 37 (“You need the 
protection that the stub quotes did not provide. That protection is really expensive. You’re going 
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the prohibition on stub quotes are common,226 which could potentially 
trigger a private right of action. Indeed, from the perspective of civil 
liability, a Flash Crash-type situation might be very problematic for market 
makers, although the adopted SRO rules take into account the existence of 
circuit breakers.227 
B. THE EMERGENCE OF HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADERS AS LIQUIDITY 
PROVIDERS 
One pivotal feature of today’s securities markets is that a good chunk of 
liquidity—at least in certain markets—is provided by market participants 
other than formal market makers with corresponding trading obligations 
and privileges: “Proprietary firms largely have replaced more traditional 
types of liquidity providers in the equity markets [although such] firms 
generally are not given special time and place privileges in exchange 
trading (nor are they subject to the affirmative and negative trading 
obligations that have accompanied such privileges).”228 Informal methods 
of providing liquidity are further reinforced by the “maker-taker” model 
adopted by many trading venues—in which liquidity rebates are paid for 
submitting “passive” orders and funded by fees charged for submitting 
“aggressive” orders—as this model was described as a “structure that 
rewards any participant that provides liquidity and charges those who 
consume liquidity.”229 Furthermore, certain trading strategies can be 
thought of as market making across different trading venues in the 
increasingly fragmented marketplace: “HFT firms tend to have their 
tentacles spread across multiple trading venues, arbitraging tiny differences 
in price . . . as a direct response to the fragmentation of trading 
                                                                                                                 
to have to pay someone to do that because it’s a lot of risk that they are going to have to take. So I 
think the circuit breaker is a better method than paying someone to take a huge amount of risk.”) 
(quoting Alison Crosthwait, Director of Global Trading Research, Instinet); id. (“Implementing 
market-maker obligations is an antidote to stopping stub quotes. Market-maker obligations are a 
positive, but we run the risk of promoting too many stringent obligations.”) (quoting Mary 
McDermott-Holland, Vice President of Transaction Services, Nasdaq OMX). 
 226. Stub Quote Rule Violations – Letter to Mary Schapiro, NANEX (Aug. 11, 2011), 
http://www.nanex.net/Research/StubRuleViolations/StubViolations.html. 
 227. See SEC’s Release on the Quotation Standards for Market Makers, supra note 3, at 
69,484–85. 
 228. SEC’s Equity Market Structure Release, supra note 1, at 3607; see also IOSCO’S REPORT 
ON TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES, supra note 1, at 24 (“By looking at traded volumes, HFT firms 
have become significant participants in the liquidity and price formation process in many markets 
and instruments and, even when acting informally in this role, have partly replaced traditional 
market makers.”). 
 229. Letter from John A. McCarthy, Gen. Counsel, Global Elec. Trading Co., to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (June 23, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov 
/comments/s7-09-10/s70910-25.pdf. 
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infrastructures.”230 Overall, de facto market making may even be the 
dominant high-frequency trading strategy.231 
On the other hand, the nature of providing liquidity may be different in 
the absence of regulatory requirements: “[T]he high-frequency trader must 
resort to more innovative, aggressive, and (some would say) predatory 
strategies than those of traditional market-makers [and such a trader] is also 
more selective than the pure market-maker when it comes to choosing 
which securities to trade . . . .”232 Furthermore, high-frequency traders may 
mix market making and proprietary trading, such as statistical arbitrage.233 
Not surprisingly, there are concerns about the unconstrained nature of such 
market making, such as a complaint expressing reservations about “some 
frictional trades going on out there that clearly look as if they are testing the 
boundaries of liquidity provision versus market manipulation.”234 With 
respect to at least some strategies employed by high-frequency traders, it is 
observed that this set of strategies is 
predatory in its aim of stepping ahead of institutional order flows [and] 
can be characterized as an opportunistic and discriminatory mimic of 
traditional market making—where HFT uses opaque advantages, 
including special order types, instead of explicit market making 
                                                                                                                 
 230. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Member of the Interim Fin. Policy 
Comm., Bank of Eng., Speech Before the Sixteenth World Congress of the International 
Economic Association 5 (July 8, 2011), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches 
/2011/speech509.pdf [hereinafter Haldane’s IEA Speech]. 
 231. See Vikas Shah, The Secrets of High Frequency Trading, ALLABOUTALPHA.COM (Sept. 6, 
2011), http://allaboutalpha.com/blog/2011/09/06/the-secrets-of-high-frequency-trading 
(registration required) (“The majority of US Equity HFT is employed in the strategy of liquidity 
provisioning, also known as electronic market making.”) (quoting Arzhang Kamarei, Tradeworx). 
 232. DURBIN, supra note 1, at 40. Given thin margins for the bulk of strategies employed by 
high-frequency traders, they prefer very liquid securities. See Peter Gomber et al., High-
Frequency Trading 15 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858626. 
 233. See Letter from Manoj Narang, Chief Exec. Officer, Tradeworx, Inc., to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n app. at 9 (Apr. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-129.pdf; see also DURBIN, supra note 1, at 40 
(describing “the quintessential high-frequency trader as a hybrid market-maker and predictor with 
awesome technological capabilities”). The general difficulty of disentangling market making from 
proprietary trading is also demonstrated by various concerns of the SEC, the Department of the 
Treasury, the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation over the 
implementation of the Volcker Rule applicable to certain commercial banks and their affiliates. 
See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, Exchange Act Release No. 65,545, 76 
Fed. Reg. 68,846 (proposed Oct. 7, 2011); see also Darrell Duffie, Market Making Under the 
Proposed Volcker Rule 1 (Jan. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available 
at http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589937022 (arguing that the “proposed 
implementation of the Volcker Rule would reduce the quality and capacity of market making 
services that banks provide to U.S. investors”). 
 234. Senate Hearing on Market Structure Issues, supra note 1, at 42 (remarks of Robert C. 
Gasser, President and Chief Executive Officer, Investment Technology Group). For several 
examples of market making strategies, some of which might appear questionable, see DURBIN, 
supra note 1, at 56–70. 
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privileges—without the market making obligations. It is not a traditional 
spread-scalping strategy that posts on each side of the spread, relying on 
speed to jump ahead of the rest of the market. It is not a traditional 
strategy based on low latency—speed is simply a prerequisite for effective 
utilization of special order types and market microstructure.235 
By contrast to informal methods of providing liquidity, some empirical 
research also favors “the presence of a market maker obligated to maintain 
a market” even in the context of liquid securities during a period of extreme 
volatility.236 
Another perspective on informal methods of providing liquidity is 
illustrated by a distinction between equity and options markets. More 
generally, “[o]ptions market makers . . . provide liquidity to a much larger 
degree than equity market makers [and] there is much less ‘natural’ 
customer-to-customer interaction in the options market than in the cash 
equities market, requiring even more market maker liquidity.”237 There are 
several reasons—chiefly the preference for very liquid securities—why 
high-frequency trading has not affected options markets to the same degree 
as equity markets: 
In relation to organised and transparent derivatives markets, the 
percentage of market share attributable to High Frequency Trading is low 
compared to that experienced in the underlying cash markets. Derivative 
contracts that are attractive to high frequency traders are those contracts 
with a large number of participants, high volatility and a high level of 
liquidity. Such contracts are most likely to be Index Future contracts, and 
will likely have tight spreads, enabling high frequency traders to get in and 
out of positions frequently, and achieve a flat end of day position. . . . 
[But] as competition increases in the derivative space and derivative 
markets become more fragmented, the likely increase in HFT in derivative 
markets could mean that we face similar issues as the equity markets have 
raised . . . .238 
It was also noted that, “as options trading takes on many of the 
characteristics of the equities market, [high-frequency traders] are dipping 
their toes in the water [although] progress may be slower and less 
                                                                                                                 
 235. Haim Bodek & Mark Shaw, Decimus Capital Mkts., LLC, Introduction to HFT Scalping 
Strategies 3 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 236. Thomas J. Boulton et al., The Flash Crash: Effects on Shareholder Wealth and Market 
Quality 12 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=1917960. 
 237. Letter from Michael J. Simon, Sec’y, Int’l Sec. Exch., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 9 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-
09/s72109-83.pdf. 
 238. Letter from Anita Collett, Senior Manager, Regulatory Strategy, London Stock Exch., to 
the Comm. of Eur. Sec. Regulators 4–5 (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://www.esma.europa.eu 
/system/files/LSEG_response_to_CESR_10_142_FINAL.pdf. 
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pronounced because of the illiquidity of many issues and the multitude of 
options series.”239 
The existence of informal liquidity providers without trading 
obligations or privileges—at least regulatory ones—by definition precludes 
the existence of a private right of action. On the other hand, some 
prominent high-frequency trading firms, such as GETCO, have joined the 
club of formal market makers.240 
C. CONFLICTS INVOLVING HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADERS AND 
FORMAL MARKET MAKERS 
In addition to providing liquidity themselves, high-frequency traders 
sometimes employ “predatory” trading strategies adverse to traditional 
market makers.241 As one securities industry professional described the 
situation, which fits the profile of a high-frequency trader, “the market 
maker [is] up against a better informed trader [such as] a quantitative trader 
. . . who performs bleeding-edge statistical analysis on screaming-fast 
computing software [and] can make reasonably confident predictions based 
on very strong alpha signals.”242 Of course, in that role, high-frequency 
traders were preceded by “SOES bandits,” “RAES bandits,” “direct access 
customers,” and other market participants that attempted to exploit various 
institutional and regulatory frictions, including trading obligations of 
market makers, in order to get ahead.243 
Types of information used by high-frequency traders include “order 
book dynamics, trade dynamics, past stock returns, cross stock correlations, 
cross asset correlations, and cross exchange information delays [or] 
illegitimately obtained or created [via] front running, quote stuffing, or 
                                                                                                                 
 239. Justin Schack & Joe Gawronski, Convergence of the U.S. Options and Equities Markets: Is 
the Party Over, or Just Getting Started?, J. TRADING, Winter 2009, at 56, 57, 67 n.7; see also 
Peter Chapman, HFTs Shun Options Marts, TRADERS MAG., Nov. 2010, at 54, 54 (listing more 
idiosyncratic reasons for a slower spread of high-frequency trading in options markets, such as 
“less use of maker-taker pricing; inferior access to the markets vis-a-vis market makers; order 
cancellation fees; an overwhelming amount of message traffic; and an inability to allocate 
executions to managed accounts” and “[t]he lack of off-exchange trading”). 
 240. See, e.g., Press Release, GETCO & NYSE Euronext, GETCO Expands Market Making 
Services at NYSE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.getcollc.com/uploads/articles/GETCO_DMM 
_Nov_30_2011.pdf; Ivy Schmerken, High-Frequency Trading Hits the Floor, WALL ST. & TECH., 
June 2010, at 20. 
 241. Some sources also point to conflicts involving high-frequency traders and institutional 
investors. See, e.g., Sal Arnuk & Joe Saluzzi, Playing Fair?, WELLING & WEEDEN, June 11, 
2010, at 1, passim, available at http://www.themistrading.com/article_files/0000/0576 
/61110_Welling_Weeden_PlayingFair.pdf; Nadia Papagiannis, Market Structure Arbitrage, 
MORNINGSTAR ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS OBSERVER, 4th Q. 2010, at 2, 3–4; Jason Zweig, 
The Market War Between Traders and Investors Heats Up, WSJ.COM (Sept. 25, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703793804575511990102886132.html. 
 242. DURBIN, supra note 1, at 93–94. 
 243. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, Informed Trading, and Market Making: 
Liquidity of Securities Markets in the Zero-Sum Game, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 15–19 
(2012). 
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layering,”244 and these trading strategies also often rely on transaction data 
feeds provided by individual trading venues.245 Furthermore, high-
frequency traders use “fundamental” company-specific and non-company-
specific information via machine-readable news feeds in order to get an 
edge with processing public information.246 Overall, information asymmetry 
in securities markets in many ways is defined by speed, and there need not 
be any inherent inequalities in access to information: “In a high-speed, co-
located world, being informed means seeing and acting on market prices 
sooner than competitors. . . . To be uninformed is to be slow.”247 In fact, the 
short-term nature of information acted on by predatory traders is 
particularly damaging to market makers compared to long-lived pieces of 
information, such as those typically involved in insider trading.248 
Furthermore, the feasibility of various short-term trading activities of high-
frequency traders has been aided by decreased bid-ask spreads in many 
markets: “[W]hen spreads narrow to a penny or less, it’s that much easier 
for a small informational advantage by the well informed trader to become a 
costly disadvantage to the less-informed market maker.”249 The conflict 
between market makers and high-frequency traders is particularly acute in 
options markets: 
Market makers, not so much in stocks as in options, must maintain tens of 
thousands or hundreds of thousands of quotes at the exchanges, and when 
some input makes them move those quotes they must move them in a 
matter of milliseconds. On the opposite side, we have High Frequency 
Traders who are waiting for just such an input signal to quickly grab those 
quotes that have not yet been moved. This is not an even playing field. It 
                                                                                                                 
 244. Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Trading, Information, and Profits 5 (U.K. Gov’t 
Office for Sci., The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets – Foresight, Driver Review 
No. 10, 2011), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners/foresight/docs/computer-
trading/11-1241-dr10-high-frequency-trading-information-and-profits.pdf. 
 245. See id. at 8. 
 246. For examples of such feeds, see Low-Latency News & Event Data for Electronic Trading, 
DOW JONES & CO., http://www.dowjones.com/salesandtrading/category-low-latency-feeds 
.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2013); Low Latency Event Data, SELERITY, INC., http://www 
.seleritycorp.com/index.php?page=the-selerity-platform (last visited Mar. 21, 2013); Thomson 
Reuters Machine Readable News, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com 
/products_services/financial/financial_products/a-z/machine_readable_news (last visited Mar. 21, 
2013). 
 247. Haldane’s IEA Speech, supra note 230, at 6. 
 248. See Dolgopolov, supra note 243, at 17. One simulation study also concluded that the 
adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads, which presumably captures the harm inflicted on 
market makers by informed trading, and the estimate of the probability of informed trading 
“incorrectly identify adverse selection when, in fact, continuation in transaction prices is due to an 
arbitrageur picking off stale limit orders, not due to adverse selection.” Qin Wang, Simulation 
Tests of Typical Adverse Selection Measures 5 (Sept. 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author), available at http://www.fma.org/Texas/Papers/simul_test_measures_fma_09.pdf. 
 249. DURBIN, supra note 1, at 94. 
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obviously takes much longer for the market maker to move thousands of 
quotes than for the HFT to hit a handful.250 
One natural consequence of these developments is that “[low-frequency 
trading] market-making has been squeezed-out by competitive pressures 
from [high-frequency trading].”251 The nature of trading strategies 
employed by high-frequency traders also explains why formal market 
makers have to catch on in terms of technology and why some high-
frequency traders themselves are joining the ranks of formal market 
makers.252 
Some clashes between market makers and high-frequency traders 
specifically stem from the fact that certain predatory algorithms take 
advantage of trading obligations of market makers—as, theoretically, any 
rules known in advance can be taken advantage of—and, in turn, market 
makers sometimes respond by utilizing “combative” algorithms.253 As an 
illustration, certain types of predatory algorithms are triggered by large 
price changes when market makers have an obligation to stay in the market 
by continuously providing quotations.254 Turning to the issue of civil 
liability, high-frequency traders employing predatory algorithms to take 
advantage of—and explicitly reply on—trading obligations of market 
makers may potentially use a private right of action, although they would 
not be very sympathetic plaintiffs. Furthermore, a natural question is 
whether the presence of such predatory traders would impose a cost on 
liquidity of securities markets via trading and litigation-related losses of 
market makers. 
                                                                                                                 
 250. Thomas Peterffy, Chairman & CEO, Interactive Brokers Grp., Comments Before the 2010 
General Assembly of the World Federation of Exchanges 6 (Oct. 11, 2010), http://investors 
.interactivebrokers.com/download/worldFederationOfExchanges.pdf [hereinafter Peterffy’s WFE 
Speech]. 
 251. Haldane’s IEA Speech, supra note 230, at 13. 
 252. See DURBIN, supra note 1, at vi, 92–94; see also Interview by Gregory Crawford with 
Ryan Terpstra, CEO, Selerity, Getting an Edge with Dividend Info, TABB FORUM (Mar. 28, 2012), 
http://www.tabbforum.com/opinions/getting-an-edge-with-dividends (registration required) 
(describing the development of a machine-readable dividend data feed, pointing out that “options 
valuations can be impacted by changes relative to market expectations before a trader or trading 
system has time to react,” and stating that “[t]he groups that should be most interested in staying 
on top of real-time dividend announcements will be option market makers and directional traders 
that look to capitalize on real-time events”). 
 253. See E-mail from securities industry professional “A” to author (Nov. 10, 2011, 8:23 CST) 
(on file with author); see also Anti-Gaming for TSX Market Makers, MARKETS MEDIA ONLINE, 
No. 2, 2011, available at http://cyborgtrading.dreamhosters.com/institutional/app/files 
/media/brochures/anti_gaming_for_tsx_market%20Makers.pdf (describing “an automated market 
making program . . . which uses algos equipped with anti-gaming software [and] is designed to 
prevent [high-frequency traders] from artificially changing the best bid/offer against market 
makers”). 
 254. Skype Interview with securities industry professional “B” (Apr. 4, 2012). 
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D. RECENT REGULATORY DEBATES ON TRADING OBLIGATIONS AND 
PRIVILEGES OF MARKET MAKERS 
Turning to recent regulatory debates, the changes in the market for 
liquidity have raised questions about the existing balance of trading 
obligations and privileges of market makers: 
The former liquidity provision model of specialists and market makers 
with central positions in the trading process has shifted to a more 
electronic form of market making with the ever more sophisticated use of 
specialized liquidity providing order types. Incentives and obligations for 
market making arguably have not adapted to, and may not appropriately 
reflect, this new world of electronic trading.255 
In fact, several initiatives to impose market making obligations on 
various types of market participants, such as high-frequency traders or firms 
internalizing their customers’ orders, have been voiced.256 The SEC itself is 
deliberating on a proposal to institute “obligations for certain high-
frequency traders to provide quotes near the national best bid and offer 
prices . . . during a certain percentage of the trading day.”257 The opposition 
                                                                                                                 
 255. SIFMA, IMPACT OF HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
REGULATORY CHANGE 6 (Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sifma.org/issues 
/item.aspx?id=8589936694. 
 256. See, e.g., JOINT CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, 
SUMMARY REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE 
MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 12 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/sec-
cftcjointcommittee/021811-report.pdf [hereinafter CFTC-SEC REPORT ON EMERGING 
REGULATORY ISSUES] (“The SEC’s review should, at a minimum, consider whether to . . . require 
firms internalizing customer order flow or executing preferenced order flow to be subject to 
market maker obligations that requires them to execute some material portion of their order flow 
during volatile market periods.”); Letter from U.S. Sen. Edward E. Kaufman to Mary L. Shapiro, 
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n att., at 2 (Aug. 5, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov 
/comments/s7-27-09/s72709-96.pdf (“[T]he SEC should impose some liquidity provision 
obligations on high frequency traders . . . to encourage [them] to post two-sided markets and 
supply investors with a consistent source of deep liquidity. In addition to affirmative liquidity 
provision obligations, the Commission should consider instituting negative obligations as well.”); 
Letter from Karrie McMillan, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-
10/s70210-138.pdf (“We recommend that the [SEC] . . . consider whether HFT firms should be 
subjected to quoting obligations similar to that of OTC market makers or any other regulations 
similar to the affirmative and negative obligations of specialists and market makers.”); Letter from 
Greg Tusar & Matthew Lavicka to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 215, at 6 (“[Securities] 
[e]xchanges should . . . consider expanding the classes of firms to which [market making] 
obligations apply, such as to firms that choose to utilize ‘step-up’ order types [such as ‘flash 
orders’] or significant bandwidth.”). 
 257. Scott Patterson & Andrew Ackerman, SEC May Ticket Speeding Traders, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 23, 2012, at C1. However, there are some hesitations within the SEC. See, e.g., Troy A. 
Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Security Traders Association 77th 
Annual Conference and Business Meeting (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech 
/2010/spch092410tap.htm (“[I]t may be difficult to impose market maker obligations on high 
frequency traders without affording them some form of compensation, such as by granting them 
privileges, as specialists themselves used to enjoy.”). Interestingly, the European Commission has 
issued the following formal proposal: 
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to such proposals, often coming from the proprietary trading community, 
has been voiced as well,258 and, of course, the issue of trading obligations of 
market makers cannot be resolved in isolation from the issue of their 
trading privileges. While there is a great deal of skepticism that trading 
obligations of market makers serve as an effective stabilizing device during 
periods of extreme volatility,259 there is support for a reformed set of such 
                                                                                                                 
An algorithmic trading strategy shall be in continuous operation during the trading 
hours of the trading venue to which it sends orders or through the systems of which it 
executes transactions. The trading parameters or limits of an algorithmic trading 
strategy shall ensure that the strategy posts firm quotes at competitive prices with the 
result of providing liquidity on a regular and ongoing basis to these trading venues at all 
times, regardless of prevailing market conditions. 
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Markets 
in Financial Instruments Repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, at 70, COM (2011) 656 Final (Oct. 20, 2011). For a critical evaluation of this proposal, 
see Dave Cliff, Market-Making Obligations and Algorithmic Trading Systems: A Feasibility 
Assessment of the March 2012 Draft of MiFID2 Article 17(3) (U.K. Gov’t Office for Sci., The 
Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets – Foresight, Economic Impact Assessment No. 
19, 2012), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/computer-trading/12-1078-
eia19-market-making-obligations-and-algorithmic-trading-systems.pdf. 
 258. See, e.g., Letter from Stuart J. Kaswell. Exec. Vice President, Managing Dir. & Gen. 
Counsel, Managed Funds Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 23 
(May 7, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-178.pdf (“Imposing 
affirmative or negative obligations on market participants would likely have the effect of raising 
barriers to entry, cause market consolidation, and induce some firms to exit the market, all of 
which would decrease competition and raise costs—to the detriment of investors.”); Letter from 
Andrew S. Margolin, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bank of Am. Merrill Lynch, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov 
/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-134.pdf (“We do not believe that market participants who obtain co-
location services should be subject to any affirmative or negative obligations, rather the focus 
should be on ensuring fair access at the market level.”). 
 259. See, e.g., CFTC-SEC REPORT ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, supra note 256, at 10 
(“[E]ven historically, [market making] obligations were of only limited effectiveness during 
periods of extreme volatility because the risks were simply too great.”); Letter from Stuart J. 
Kaswell, Exec. Vice President, Managing Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Managed Funds Ass’n, to 
Members of the Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Comm. on Emerging Regulatory Issues et al. 4 (Sept. 
12, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/265-26/265-26-38.pdf (“We do not believe 
that more stringent market maker obligations for [additional categories of market participants] will 
prevent a future market break.”); Michael A. Mendelson, AQR Capital Mgmt. LLC, Statement 
Before the Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues 8 (Aug. 11, 
2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/265-26/265-26-34.pdf (“[O]n those rare occasions when 
markets are severely disrupted, market-maker obligations will accomplish nothing.”); see also 
Interview by Mike O’Hara with Natan Tiefenbrun, Commercial Dir., Turquoise, Market 
Surveillance, Liquidity Shocks and Regulation, HFT REV. (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://www.hftreview.com/pg/file/mike/read/5337/market-surveillance-liquidity-shocks-and-
regulation (registration required) (arguing that the proposal to subject high-frequency traders to 
the obligation “to post two-sided quotes during times of market stress [is misguided because these 
market participants] manage their risk the most tightly . . . try and maintain very diversified 
positions . . . don’t hold positions for any great length of time and don’t have a huge amount of 
capital”). 
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obligations as a tool to enhance liquidity of securities markets.260 Cautious 
or even intransigent statements that question or attack the desirability of 
trading obligations of market makers—notably, the affirmative obligation—
as such261 appear to be misguided and perhaps overemphasize extreme 
scenarios. 
Furthermore, there are concerns about the viability of market making in 
certain segments of the securities industry—partly because of uneven 
regulatory requirements vis-à-vis de facto liquidity providers.262 Several 
regulatory proposals in fact addressed various approaches to additional 
incentives for market makers.263 One potential concern, which also includes 
                                                                                                                 
 260. See, e.g., Haldane’s IEA Speech, supra note 230, at 17 (“In principle, a commitment by 
market-makers to provide liquidity, whatever the state of the market, would go to the heart of 
potential price discontinuity problems [and] lessen the chances of liquidity droughts and 
associated fat tails and persistence in prices.”); Letter from Edward E. Kaufman to Mary L. 
Shapiro, supra note 256, att., at 2–3 (“While no degree of affirmative or negative obligations will 
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 261. See, e.g., Examining the Efficiency, Stability, and Integrity of the U.S. Capital Markets: J. 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban 
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reduces volatility or makes markets more efficient is not evident. . . . Markets will function will 
without an affirmative obligation. Market makers need no regulatory obligations and should not 
receive special privileges.”); Harold Bradley & Robert E. Litan, Choking the Recovery: Why New 
Growth Companies Aren’t Going Public and Unrecognized Risks of Future Market Disruptions 66 
(Nov. 12, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/etf_study_11-8-10.pdf (“History shows that affirmative 
obligations affirm only intermediaries’ profits.”). 
 262. See, e.g., Senate Hearing on Market Structure Issues, supra note 1, at 85 (prepared 
statement of Peter Driscoll, Chairman, Securities Traders Association) (“[Market makers] retained 
all of their obligations to the market . . . but the rewards for these obligations were cut 
dramatically. Traditional market making became unprofitable and most market making firms 
reduced their market making activity or bowed out of the business altogether.”); Jacob Bunge & 
Brendan Conway, Options Exchanges Decry Possible Exit of Market Maker, WSJ.COM (Oct. 5, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703298504575534101333589296.html 
(registration required) (describing the concern of one firm that considered “curtail[ing] its role as a 
registered market maker in options because of tough competition from smaller rivals that operate 
with fewer requirements”); Larry Tabb, Restarting the Engines of Growth, TABB FORUM (Apr. 20, 
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 263. See, e.g., CFTC-SEC REPORT ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, supra note 256, at 10 
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the civil liability perspective, is whether certain trading privileges, such as 
time and information advantages, might conflict with trading obligations 
compared to more “transparent” advantages, such as pricing and order flow 
allocation incentives or subsidies from issuers, because of the blurry line 
between market making and proprietary trading.264 
A more general proposal even argues for imposing a degree of 
uniformity across trading venues with respect to trading obligations and 
privileges of market makers: 
[T]he definition of market making activity and the establishment of 
incentives for this activity should not be the left to individual market 
centers. To permit market centers to drive this critical regulatory issue not 
only ensures disparate and potentially conflicting rules, but it also 
encourages competition among exchanges on the basis of regulation—a 
situation which leads either to a race to the bottom in which market maker 
obligations are completely eviscerated, or to exclusive market maker 
designations that increase dependence on single firms.265 
A similar proposal maintained that “the eligibility requirements and 
obligations of market makers should be uniform across all exchanges and 
trading venues.”266 A counterargument is that varying sets of trading 
obligations and privileges of market makers is an essential tool of 
competition among trading venues and a vehicle of innovation, although 
there could be some general harmonized principles.267 
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true affirmative quoting or trading requirements” and proposing a minimum set of standards 
applicable to the bulk of market makers in the wake of the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010). 
 266. Letter from U.S. Sen. Charles E. Schumer to Mary Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Aug. 11, 2010), http://schumer.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=327160. 
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Some regulatory proposals raise red flags in the context of civil liability 
of market makers. For instance, imposing both affirmative and negative 
obligations on certain types of traders, as suggested by some regulatory 
proposals,268 would effectively confine such traders’ activities to market 
making and invite additional—and potentially very costly—scrutiny of their 
transactions. The chief complication with this proposal is the difficulty of 
disentangling market making and proprietary trading.269 Other controversial 
regulatory proposals relevant for market makers in the high-speed trading 
environment pertain to the intertwined issues of imposing a minimum order 
duration and limiting order cancellation. Such measures have been largely 
opposed by the trading community,270 although they have gained support 
from some institutional investors and brokerage firms271 and, rather 
                                                                                                                 
venues, and common regulatory imposed standards make it harder to create that differentiation 
and hence support competition.”). 
 268. See, e.g., Letter from Edward E. Kaufman to Mary L. Shapiro, supra note 256, att., at 2; 
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supra note 215, at 7–8 (“[T]he [SEC] should avoid regulatory measures that would artificially 
slow down the pace of trading during normal market operations, such as an across-the-board 
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rewarding participants that do expose orders for a set duration.” Letter from Brett F. Mock & John 
C. Giesea to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra, at 8. 
 271. See, e.g., Letter from O. Mason Hawkins, Chairman & CEO, et al., Se. Asset Mgmt., Inc., 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Oct. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-295.pdf (“We strongly encourage the 
Commission to institute a minimum order duration of one second to be implemented at the 
exchange level.”); Christopher Nagy, Managing Dir., Order Strategy and Co-Head of Gov’t 
Relations & John S. Markle, Deputy Gen. Counsel and Co-Head of Gov’t Relations, TD 
Ameritrade, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 (Apr. 21, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-10/s70210-124.pdf (“A requirement should be 
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2013] Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World 357 
surprisingly, even some market making firms.272 One potential consequence 
of the imposition of a minimum order duration is that “the likelihood that 
your quotes become stale [would] increase significantly [thus allowing 
others, such as high-frequency traders] to trade on your outdated quotes and 
thus pocket an easy profit,”273 a scenario that could trigger civil litigation 
over non-compliance. Another warning emphasizes that this regulatory 
measure would “introduce[e] additional systemic risk to the market as a 
whole.”274 A critic of cancellation fees also pointed to its potentially 
anticompetitive effect on liquidity providers operating across trading 
venues: 
If I’m a market maker and I post my bids and offers in two markets and I 
trade in one market then I cancel in the other one as well because I only 
have a certain amount of capital to deploy. Now, if I’m going to be 
charged for those cancellations I can’t afford to be a market maker in 
multiple venues. So, it would drive further consolidation amongst 
venues.275 
On the other hand, the proposal to establish mandatory cancellation fees 
does have substantial support thrown behind it,276 and there have been 
several modest initiatives by individual trading venues to address this 
issue,277 but specific exemptions for formal market makers are possible and 
perhaps desirable.278 Furthermore, there has been some experimentation 
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with the minimum order duration feature on the optional basis by some 
trading venues.279 More generally, mandatory market-wide rules addressing 
these issues with the aim of producing tangible benefits for the trading 
process, while not in the realm of the impossible, might be difficult to 
implement, perhaps requiring a redesign of specific trading and order 
aggregation mechanisms and a synchronization of different trading 
venues.280 Of course, from the standpoint of civil liability, measures that 
mandate a minimum order duration or prolong the exposure of posted 
orders may encourage opportunistic civil litigation—potentially involving 
predatory traders. 
CONCLUSION 
Potential civil liability of market makers for violations of trading 
obligations and abuses of trading privileges is real and, from a number of 
perspectives, logical, staying within the boundaries established by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. While there are doctrinal hurdles to reaching this result 
under a spectrum of scenarios, several recent decisions on the appellate 
level suggest a broader availability of a private right of action under the 
federal antifraud prohibition—even in the context of violations of SRO 
rules—as an incipient trend. In addition to potential SEC and SRO 
sanctions, as well as criminal liability under federal securities law, the 
threat of civil litigation may promote the broad goals of federal securities 
law and supplement other available remedies—especially if other 
participants are unable or unwilling to play that role.281 On the other hand, 
the existence of a private right of action may have a detrimental effect on 
                                                                                                                 
cancellations related to making markets is one thing, orders sent to the market with no intention of 
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Exchange Act Release No. 65,610, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,012 (Oct. 24, 2011). 
 280. For a related discussion, see J. Doyne Farmer & Spyros Skouras, Minimum Resting Times 
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securities markets if the balance of trading obligations and privileges of 
market makers exposes them to opportunistic lawsuits, becoming an 
additional cost of providing liquidity and even a market-wide externality. 
Such opportunistic plaintiffs may come from the ranks of high-frequency 
traders, whose existence perhaps will change the landscape of securities 
litigation, although some trading strategies employed by these market 
participants are spotlight-shy. 
The availability of a private right of action could be either a reality 
check on the reasonableness of the balance of trading obligations and 
privileges of market makers for the SEC and individual trading venues or a 
magnification of potential problems—especially in light of the recent events 
that demonstrated the fragility of market making business.282 Accordingly, 
the current push in the direction of more stringent trading obligations of 
market makers and the imposition of such obligations on a variety of 
market participants—while often ignoring incentives for providing 
liquidity—should be approached with caution. Furthermore, in some cases, 
alternative regulatory solutions would be preferable; for instance, properly 
crafted procedures for breaking up erroneous trades or circuit breakers 
during periods of extreme volatility appear to be a much better option than 
protracted civil litigation over the duty of market makers to “catch a falling 
knife.”283 In any instance, striking a balance in order to discourage 
opportunistic behavior by both market makers and potential plaintiffs 
remains an important policy issue on both SEC and SRO levels for the 
evolving architecture of securities markets.284 
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whether on the SEC or SRO levels, it is reasonable to expect that, “[while] predation of liquidity 
suppliers should be discouraged . . . [m]easuring and defining predation would undoubtedly prove 
challenging, intrusive, and contentious.” Carole Camerton-Forde et al., Time Variation in 
Liquidity: The Role of Market-Maker Inventories and Revenues, 65 J. FIN. 295, 326 (2010). 
